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Abstract 
Recently countries have become more aware of the potential anti-competitive effects of anti-
dumping measures. This is mostly due to the view that anti-dumping measures, as trade 
policy instruments, are at odds with the objectives of competition policy. According to many 
economic writers the only rational economic justification for anti-dumping measures is 
predatory dumping as an extreme form of price discrimination. Apart from the dramatic 
change in the economic justification for the use of anti-dumping measures over the last 
decades, there has also been a significant change in the countries that implement these 
measures. Since the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations there has been a shift 
from developed countries to developing countries being the main users of these policy tools. 
In the last couple of years the member countries of the Southern African Customs Union have 
been under increased pressure by private firms to enable the use of anti-dumping measures on 
intra-regional goods trade. However, the appropriateness of utilising these measures on intra-
regional trade in the context of a custom union has been a contentious issue in recent 
economic debate. These measures erect trade barriers among the member states which are 
against the basic premise of a customs union. This has resulted in most economists calling for 
the prohibition and replacement of anti-dumping measure with either coordinated domestic or 
harmonised regional competition policies.  
 
In developing the regional and national policies on anti-dumping the SACU member states 
can follow two main stream approaches. The first is the incorporation of various competition 
principles into anti-dumping rules to limit the negative welfare and anti-competitive effects of 
utilising anti-dumping measures, while the second is the abolition of anti-dumping measures 
in the region which is then replaced by competition policy. The option best suited for SACU 
depends on the differing viewpoints on implementing anti-dumping measures in a customs 
union. However, irrespective of which policy combination is chosen, regional and national 
polices and authorities will have to be created, adapted and/or amended in order to have an 
effective interaction between anti-dumping and competition policies applicable to intra-
regional trade. 
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Opsomming 
Lande het ontlangs meer bewus geword van die moontlike negatiewe uitwerking wat 
maatreëls teen storting van goedere in markte kan hê op plaaslike en internasionale 
mededinging. Dit is hoofsaaklik as gevolg van die siening dat teen-stortingsmaatreëls, as 
instrumente van handelsbeleid, se doelwitte teenstrydig is met die van mededingingsbeleid. 
Volgens vele ekonomiese skrywers is die enigste rasionele ekonomiese regverdiging vir teen-
stortingsmaatreëls predatoriese storting as ‘n uiterse vorm van prysdiskriminasie. Afgesien 
van die dramatiese verandering in die ekonomiese regverdiging vir die gebruik van teen-
storingsmaatreëls oor die laaste dekades, het daar ook ‘n beduidende verandering plaasgevind 
in die lande wat hierdie maatreëls om goedere handel implementeer. Sedert die Uruguay 
Rondte van Multi-laterale Handelsooreenkomste het daar ‘n verskuiwing plaasgevind van 
ontwikkelde lande na ontwikkellende lande as die belangrikste gebruikers van hierdie 
beleidsinstrumente. In die laaste paar jaar het private firmas die lidlande van die Suider-
Afrikaanse Doeane-Unie onder toenemede druk begin plaas vir die gebruik van teen-
storingsmaatreëls op invoere vanaf die res van die streek. Alhoewel, huidiglik is die 
toepaslikehid van die gebruik van hierdie maatreëls op handel, in die konteks van ‘n doeane-
unie, steeds ‘n omstrede kwessie binne ekonomiese dabatte. Hierdie maatreëls rig 
handelsversperrings tussen lidlande op wat teen die basiese veronderstelling van ‘n doeane-
unie is. As gevolg hiervan is die meeste ekonome van die opinie dat teen-storingsmaatreëls 
vervang moet word met óf gekoördineerde binnelandse of geharmoniseerde streeks- 
mededingingsbeleid.  
 
Die SADU-lidlande kan twee benaderings volg in die ontwikkeling van streeks- en nasionale 
beleid oor teen-storingsmaatreëls. Die eerste is the insluiting van verskillende 
mededingingsbeginsels in bepalings wat handel oor teen-storingsmaatreëls om sodoende die 
moontlike negatiewe gevolge van hierdie maatreëls te beperk. Die tweede opsie is om teen-
storingsmaatreëls op streeks-invoere met bededingingsbeleid te vervang. Die mees gepasde 
opsie sal af hang van die verskillende standpunte rondom die toepaslikheid van teen-
stortingsmaatreëls in ‘n doeane-unie. Alhoewel, ongeag die beleidskombinasie wat gekies 
word sal nasionale en streeks-beleid en owerhede geskep, aangepas en/of gewysig moet word 
ten einde ‘n effektiewe interaksie tussen teen-storingsmaatreëls en mededingingsbeleid binne 
SADU te verseker. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Recently countries have become more concerned about the potential anti-competitive effects 
of anti-dumping measures. This has mostly emerged form the view that anti-dumping 
measures, as a trade policy instrument, are at odds with the objectives of competition policy.  
The relationship between trade and competition policy is complex due to the overlapping 
effects of these policies. Commonly stated, while competition policy aims to reduce the 
power of domestic producers, trade policy aims to ensure the market power of the domestic 
producers in order to shift economic rents from foreign suppliers to the domestic government 
and producers at the cost of consumer welfare and the overall welfare of society. Although it 
is commonly stated that these policies have differing objectives, there are also a degree of 
complementarity between trade and competition policies, based on a theoretical common 
foundation as a reference point: the theory of free trade and perfectly competitive markets in 
order to achieve economic efficiency in the allocation of resources. 
 
The debate surrounding the interaction between competition and trade policy is based on 
three main contentions:  
 trade liberalisation can be frustrated by inefficient national competition policy; 
 trade policies can have in itself uncompetitive effects in the domestic and 
international market; and  
 government regulation can frustrate the objectives of both trade and competition 
policies 
 
Anti-dumping measures, as a tool of trade policy, can also be formulated in such a manner 
that it is at odds with the objectives of competition policy: competition protect the consumer 
from anti-competitive behaviour by firms and governments in the market, while anti-dumping 
law protects domestic firms and the factors of production employed in the relevant domestic 
market. Anti-dumping measures do not prohibit specific actions, like price fixing and resale 
price maintenance which would otherwise be prohibited under competition policy. On the 
other hand anti-dumping does prohibit competition through price differentiation which is 
generally legitimate competitive behaviour under competition policy. 
 
As pricing strategies, the use of anti-dumping measures has been justified to address price 
discrimination and predatory pricing. Dumping as price discrimination entails a foreign firm 
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being able to segment the home and export market according to the willingness of the 
consumers to pay in the differing markets. The firms are thus able to maximise its profits by 
charging different prices in the different markets according to different elasticity’s of 
demand. Predatory pricing has been the most commonly used argument to justify the 
implementation of anti-dumping measures. In terms of dumping, predatory pricing implies 
that a foreign firm has the ability to export a product at a lower price than the price of the 
product in the exporting market in order to eliminate competitors and deter new entrants in 
the importing market. If the exporting firm is successful in achieving its goal and gain 
monopoly power in the importing market, the monopolist can recoup losses by increasing 
prices to monopoly price levels.  
 
The main objective of a regional trade agreement is the removal of trade barriers in order to 
enhance the development of the trading partners and integrate the individual economies of the 
countries into the global economy. However, the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
among trading partners can place new demands on governments to protect struggling 
domestic industries due to increased trade liberalisation efforts. Anti-dumping measures are 
generally included in a regional agreement to satisfy the bureaucracies to protect import-
competing sectors and to meet political demands for protectionism if the trade liberalisation 
process is perceived as a threat to the domestic economy. Retaining anti-dumping measures 
in a regional trade agreement can have some unintended consequences for consumers and 
intermediate product users in the domestic market. From the perspective of the consumer the 
use of anti-dumping measures are economically irrational due to the negative impact it can 
have on consumer welfare. 
 
The argument has been made that there is no room in a regional trade agreement for anti-
dumping, due to anti-dumping measures being against the basic principles of a regional trade 
agreement in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 allows the 
retention of anti-dumping measures in a customs union is a contentious issue among 
economic and legal authors in the field. The arguments around this issue have been based on 
three main questions: whether Article XXIV mandates anti-dumping measures to be 
eliminated from intra-regional trade in a customs union or allow the trading partners to either 
maintain or eliminate anti-dumping measures in a customs union. Currently there are only a 
few regional arrangements which have been successful in abolishing anti-dumping measures 
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from the regional arrangements, including the European Community, European Economic 
Area and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement. 
 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is a customs union with South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland as member countries. The 2002 SACU 
Agreement allows for anti-dumping measures (as unfair trade practices) and competition 
policy in the agreement. However, the ambit of these provisions is quite limited. There is also 
a lack of anti-dumping law and competition policies in some of the member countries. This 
can pose a challenge for SACU countries to cooperate on the basis of competition policies or 
eliminate the use of anti-dumping measures from the regional trade agreement. There are 
various options SACU can consider in order to remove anti-dumping measures from the 
regional agreement: the complete replacement of anti-dumping measures with competition 
policy, the simultaneous implementation of completion policy and anti-dumping law, 
utilising competition principles in the anti-dumping investigation or using anti-dumping as a 
measure of last resort. However, the SACU member countries will need to consider a number 
of factors in order to determine the most efficient policy combination: the institutions 
available in SACU and the member countries, the different developmental goals of the 
individual countries, the position of the countries in the current global economy and the 
overall goal of SACU as a regional arrangement. 
 
1.2 Background 
Globalisation and trade liberalisation have highlighted the issue of fair competition in 
international trade. The opening up of markets can increase competition from foreign firms, 
but also creates the addition issue of dumping excess output by developed and developing 
countries. There is the growing concern that anti-competitive behaviour by private firms can 
harm international trade which requires national policies to promote the conditions of 
competition (Economic Commission for Africa, 2000:3). 
 
The first country to adopt anti-dumping legislation in 1904 was Canada, followed by 
Australia in 1906 and various other countries up to the 1920s. After this first flurry of 
countries adopting anti-dumping laws Viner (1923) provided the first comprehensive analysis 
of anti-dumping measures and its economic rationale as a measure for addressing 
discriminatory pricing and cartels. In the 1950s anti-dumping laws gained more world-wide 
status with increasingly more countries adopting and implementing these laws. At the end of 
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2001 94 countries had domestic anti-dumping laws in place (Wooton & Zanardi, 2002:4). 
This initial rationale for anti-dumping measures has changed drastically over the years. 
According to many economic writers the only rational economic justification for anti-
dumping measures is predatory dumping. This is an extreme form of price discrimination 
where a dominant firm intentionally lowers prices to the extent that competitors will be 
driven from the market, leaving the initial dominant firm as the only remaining firm in the 
market. However, this concern has been dwindling in recent years with many economists 
seeing the modern day implementation of anti-dumping measures as having less to do with 
predation and more as a protectionist tool which is detached from any behaviour associated 
with dumping (Wooton & Zanardi, 2002:12). Anti-dumping measures are seen as a mere 
substitute for tariff protection as trade liberalisation has increased or a pure protectionist tool 
used by the traditional users of anti-dumping measures to protect their market share (Wooton 
& Zanardi, 2002:13). 
 
Apart from a dramatic change in the economic rationale and justification for the use of anti-
dumping measures over the last decades, there has also been a significant change in the 
countries that implement and are affected by anti-dumping measures. Since the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was launched and the WTO Agreement on anti-
dumping measures entered into force there has been a drastic change in the number and 
variety of countries using anti-dumping measures. Prior to the Uruguay Round the primary 
users of anti-dumping measures were developed countries, including Australia, the EU and 
the United States. Between 1990 and 1999 50 percent of the anti-dumping investigations 
were initiated by the EU, Australia, the United States and Canada. Developing countries 
accounted for 39 percent of the anti-dumping investigations over the same time period. 
However, it seems that the imports of developing countries have always been the target of 
anti-dumping investigations. Between 1990 and 1999 anti-dumping investigations targeted 
the exports of developed countries in 35 percent of all cases, while 66 percent of 
investigations were against the exports from developing countries (UNCTAD Secretariat, 
2000:4).  
 
The WTO statistical database on implemented anti-dumping measures gives an indication of 
how the composition of countries utilising anti-dumping measures have changed over the last 
decades. The database provides anti-dumping data from 1995 to 2011 (investigations and 
measures under the WTO) according to exporting (affected countries) and reporting 
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(implementing countries) countries.  The data was then divided into developing and 
developed countries according to the country classifications utilised by the United Nations 
(See Addendum B). The figure below shows two graphs. The first indicates the number of 
anti-dumping measures which have been implemented against the imports of developing 
versus developed countries over the time period. The second shows the dynamics between 
developed exporting and reporting countries and developing exporting and reporting 
countries. 
 
Figure 1: Anti-dumping measures by exporting and reporting countries 
 
Source: WTO Statistics on anti-dumping measures (2012) 
 
Figure 1(a) shows how developed and developing countries have been affected by the 
implementation of anti-dumping measures. Between 1995 and 2011 anti-dumping measures 
were implemented on the exports of developing countries in 60 percent of all cases, while 40 
percent of all measures were implemented on the exports of developed countries. Over the 
time period the exports of developing countries have been the main target of anti-dumping 
duties, except in 1998 and 1999 when anti-dumping measures on developed country exports 
surpassed measures on developing country exports. Exports from China have mainly been 
targeted by anti-dumping measures, accounting for 24 percent of duties imposed over the 
time period. 
 
Figure 1(b) shows that there has been a shift from the traditional users of anti-dumping 
measures. Prior to 1995 developed countries were the main users of these measures. 
However, there has been a significant increase in the amount of anti-dumping duties 
implemented by developing countries. Between 1995 and 2011 developing countries 
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implemented 67 percent of all anti-dumping measures, while developed countries accounted 
for only 33 percent of all final anti-dumping duties. India, Argentina and China are the three 
developing countries which have utilised anti-dumping measures most, accounting for 32 
percent of all anti-dumping duties from 1995 to 2011.  
 
Figure 2: Anti-dumping measures: developing versus developed countries 
 
Source: WTO Statistics on anti-dumping measures (2012) 
 
Although exports from developing countries have always been a target for anti-dumping 
investigations, traditionally these measures were imposed by developed countries. This 
dynamic has also changed drastically over the last decades. Figure 2 shows that there has 
been a shift from developed countries targeting the exports of developing countries to 
developing countries targeting the exports of other developing countries. Out of all the anti-
dumping measures implemented between 1995 and 2011 42 percent of these measures were 
implemented by developing countries on the exports of other developing countries, while in 
25 percent of all cases developing countries targeted the exports of developed countries. 
Developing countries exports are still the main target of anti-dumping measures by developed 
countries (21 percent of all anti-dumping measures) with developed countries targeting the 
exports of other developed countries in only 12 percent of all anti-dumping measures 
implemented over the time period.  
 
Many regional trade agreements include provisions on anti-dumping measures and 
competition issues. Although there are also those trade agreements with limited to no 
42% 
25% 
21% 
12% 
Developing vs developing
country
Developing vs developed
country
Developed vs developing
country
Developed vs developed
country
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provisions made for utilising these measures on the intra-regional level. According Rey 
(2012:7-10) at the end of November 2010 just over 192 regional trade agreements were 
notified to the GATT/WTO as being in force with approximately 78 percent of these 
agreements containing specific provisions on anti-dumping measures.   
 
According to Wooton and Zanardi (2002:33) the combination of anti-dumping and 
competition policy and the degree of coordination or harmonisation of policies depend on the 
degree of bilateral or regional integration countries want to achieve. The table below shows 
the interaction among anti-dumping and competition policy combinations as the level of 
integration progresses linear from shallow to deeper regional integration. As countries move 
from no formal bilateral or regional relationships with trading partners to shallow regional 
integration agreements (free trade agreement) and finally the deepest form of regional 
integration, a common market, increasing demands are placed on effective interaction among 
trade and competition policy and the coordination and harmonisation of trade policy and 
competition law among the trading partners. This creates a challenge for any regional 
relationship with the aim of deepening integration, especially those regional arrangements 
which are faced by different levels of economic development, legal frameworks and 
institutional capabilities and capacity.  
 
Table 1: Trade and competition policy according to the level of regional integration 
Level of 
integration Trade Policy Competition Policy 
No 
bilateral/regional 
integration 
Unilateral tariffs and national anti-dumping 
policy 
National competition policy 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
Free flow of intra-regional goods; national 
trade policy on extra-regional trade in goods; 
no supra-national or regional bodies; 
possible removal of intra-regional anti-
dumping measures  
National competition policy 
Customs Union 
Common external tariff; common external 
anti-dumping policy; regional bodies; 
elimination of anti-dumping measures on 
intra-regional trade 
Harmonised or coordinated 
competition policy on intra-
regional trade 
Common Market 
Common external tariff; elimination of intra-
regional anti-dumping measures; common 
external anti-dumping policy; supra-national 
bodies  
Harmonised/common 
competition policy with supra-
national laws and authority 
Source: Wooton & Zanardi (2002:33) 
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Competition policy and the interaction between competition policy and international trade are 
seen as one of the ‘new trade issues’ which must be considered by WTO member countries 
on the multilateral level (Hoekman & Holmes, 1999:1).  Hoekman and Holmes (1999:10) 
states that one of the main reasons for multilateral trade policy and coordination through the 
WTO is that member countries might be driven by unilateral incentives to deviate from the 
goal of free trade. Recently the same type of argument has been put forward by some WTO 
members to coordinate competition policy on the multilateral level. The openness of a 
country does not necessarily guarantee product market competition and the erosion of 
monopolies requiring multilateral competition policy as a complement to multilateral trade 
policy. A firm’s monopoly power can be eroded through either increased imports or through 
increased entry by other firms into the domestic market. While the first falls under trade 
policy, the second forms part of national competition policy. According to Hoekman and 
Movroidis (1994:11), if the WTO functions properly the free flow of imports into a domestic 
market can be the best way to guarantee consumer welfare and the profitability of firms in the 
market. The free flow of imports will not only reduce domestic prices (benefitting the 
domestic consumer), but also domestic wages (reducing input costs and increasing 
profitability). This will reduce the distortions in both the domestic labour and product 
markets. However, increased domestic competition, without increased import competition, 
will only remove distortions in the product market and leave any distortions in the labour 
market in place (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:11). According to Hoekman and Mavroidis 
(1994:12) due to the potential of import competition to reduce both product and labour 
market distortions, multilateral trade and competition policy can be used as complementary 
policies to reduce labour market imperfections and move domestic markets to be more 
competitive. 
 
According to Bilal and Olarreaga (1998:153) competition and trade policy are imperfect 
substitutes due to the manner in which these policies affect market openness and structure. 
While different trade policy measures can be ranked according to their impact on welfare, the 
merit of competition rules depend on the objectives the political authorities aim to attain by 
utilising these rules. These policies have some common features:  
 Competition policies recognise that there can be some inefficiency when there is 
imperfect competition in the market.  
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 Competition policy aims to prevent uncompetitive behaviour which can arise in the 
imperfect competitive market through the control of collusion and mergers among 
firms and the abuse of a dominant position in the market.  
 In principle the aim of competition policy is not to address market power, but rather to 
deter a firm which have market power from abusing its dominant position in order to 
ensure market access conditions in the market and fair competition (Bilal & 
Olarreaga, 1998:154).  
 
The concern for international competition has led to two different approaches to integrate 
trade and competition policy. The first is to use trade policy measures to ensure international 
competition through encouraging trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment to 
promote competition. Trade policy authorities can also incorporate some trade principles into 
existing trade policies. The second premise is to promote competition through utilising 
multilateral competition rules. This will rely on the co-ordination of national competition 
policies or the harmonisation of policies among countries or an agreement on internationally 
acceptable competition rules on the multilateral level (Bilal & Olarreaga, 1998:17). 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
In recent years the significant increase in the use of anti-dumping measures has been a cause 
of concern among WTO member countries. In the last couple of years the member countries 
of SACU have been under increased pressure by private firms to enable the use of anti-
dumping measures on intra- and extra-regional goods trade. However, SACU is a customs 
union under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland forming the five member countries of the customs area. The main aim 
of the SACU arrangement is to allow for the free trade in goods among the member states 
and a common external tariff which applies to all extra-regional trade in goods. Free trade in 
the context of SACU means that the member countries aim to eliminate tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on all intra-regional trade in goods. Over the years economists have 
been, and are still, debating the appropriateness of anti-dumping measures on intra-regional 
trade in the context of a free trade agreement and a customs union. Especially in the case of a 
customs union, where there are no internal borders to trade and a common policy regarding 
trade with third party countries. In this context the use of anti-dumping measures on intra-
regional trade can be difficult to implement and justify. These measures erect trade barriers 
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among the member countries which are against the basic premise of a customs union. For this 
reason most economists have suggested that anti-dumping measures have no place in a 
customs union and should be prohibited and replaced with either coordinated or harmonised 
competition policies.  
 
Accordingly, this research examine the appropriate interaction between anti-dumping policy, 
as a trade policy measure, and competition policy in SACU by looking at the theory of 
dumping under both policy instruments, the function and suitability of anti-dumping 
measures in the context of a customs union, those regional arrangements which have 
prohibited the use of anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade, the regional and 
domestic anti-dumping and competition mandates and the policy options available for the 
effective interaction among anti-dumping and competition policy on intra-SACU trade. 
Based on the findings of the research and experiences of other regional arrangement this 
research also provides recommendations and conclusions.  
 
1.4 Significance of the research 
This research will contribute to the body of knowledge, especially in the case of anti-
dumping measures on intra-SACU trade on which the literature is very limited. Furthermore, 
it will inform policy formulation and decision making on the national level in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland and on the SACU level. Finally, the research 
investigates the national and regional challenges for intra-SACU anti-dumping measures and 
will add to current discussions on incorporating multi-lateral anti-dumping measures into the 
regional agreement without detracting from the goal of deeper regional integration. 
 
1.5 Literature review 
It seems that the main distinction between trade and competition policy are due to the distinct 
objectives of these two policies. National competition policy can be defined as ‘the set of 
rules and disciplines maintained by governments relating either to agreements between firms 
that restrict competition or to the abuse of a dominant position’ (Hoekman & Mavroidis 
(1994)). The underlying objective of competition law tends to be the maximisation of 
national welfare through the efficient allocation of resources (Hoekman & Mavroidis (1994)). 
 
Governments pursue trade policy tools for various reasons, including an increase in revenue, 
the protection of domestic industries and to attain certain foreign policy goals. Anti-dumping 
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policy is a component of trade policy which is applied in the case of unfair trade practices 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis (1994)). According to the GATT 1994 anti-dumping measures are 
utilised to address the exportation of a product at an export price below the normal value of 
the same product in the domestic market of the exporting firm. Anti-dumping policy is thus 
used to address either price discrimination or predatory pricing in the importing market 
(Florencio (2007)). Anti-dumping policy aims to redistribute income among markets to 
protect the domestic factors of production employed in a specific industry against foreign 
imports, often in an inefficient way. Otherwise stated the difference between competition and 
anti-dumping policy is that the first protects competition, while the latter protects competitors 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis (1994)). Codot, Grether & De Mellio (2000) is of the view that 
competition and trade policy are at odds with one another.  
 
According to Hoekman and Holmes (1999), Jenny (1999) and Merrett (2003) there is also a 
matter of complementarity between competition and trade policy. Government policy should 
aim to protect the competitive process so that any excess profits can be eliminated through 
competition among firms. A liberal trade policy can be seen as the most effective and 
efficient competition policy instrument available to any national government to attain this 
objective. This is because import competition is important for market discipline, especially in 
countries with highly concentrated markets.   
 
In a regional trade configuration the utilisation of anti-dumping policy can have a significant 
impact on the competitiveness of trade within the region. Anti-dumping rules are seen as 
being inefficient and disadvantage producers, exporters, importers and consumers (Hoekman 
(1998)). The argument has been made that anti-dumping rules are inherently protectionist just 
by being included in national legislation, but also leads to anti-competitive effects due to the 
manner these rules are implemented. Due to the potential welfare effects of anti-dumping 
measures Finger (1993), Bilal and Olarreaga (1998), Spinanger (2002), and Voon (2009) 
have called for the replacement of anti-dumping policy with competition rules, especially in 
terms of regional trade arrangements. Recently Mathis (2000), Gobbi and Horlick (2006), 
Emerson (2008) and Voon (2009) have stated that anti-dumping measures have no place in a 
customs union and are against the basic premise of a regional trade arrangement.  
 
It is suggested that the elimination of anti-dumping measures and the harmonisation of 
competition policy can enhance economic welfare. However, the ability of a regional trade 
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arrangement to utilise competition policy will depend on the national and regional anti-
dumping rules, competition principles and institutions and the level of integration present in 
the regional configuration (Prusa & Teh (2009)). In terms of abolishing anti-dumping rules 
from a regional trade arrangement, four configurations have been successful in eliminating 
anti-dumping measures. These are the European Union, the Closer Economic Relations 
Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, the European Economic Area between the 
European Union and the European Free Trade Association and the Canada-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement. The member countries of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) have 
undertaken to eliminate anti-dumping duties on intra-regional trade and are still in the process 
of developing and harmonising common competition policy (Economic Laws Practice 
(2009)).   
 
SACU is a customs union with the agenda for deeper regional integration among the member 
states. The 2002 SACU Agreement allows for a common regional policy in terms of anti-
dumping, the establishment of a regional body to evaluate the implementation of any anti-
dumping duties and national bodies in each member country to investigate any allegation of 
dumping in the region. In terms of competition policy the 2002 SACU Agreement only states 
that member countries should cooperation on issues of competition in terms of each country’s 
domestic competition policy. Currently the common anti-dumping policy has not been 
developed, the regional body has not been established and no members, except South Africa, 
have implemented a national body and domestic legislation to address dumping. Thus far the 
South African national body, ITAC is undertaking all investigations pertaining to an 
allegation of dumping in the SACU domestic market. However, all member countries, except 
Lesotho, do have national competition policies in place. 
 
According to the literature there are four possible options in terms of how anti-dumping 
polices and competition policy can function in unison. The first is the elimination of anti-
dumping measures and the harmonisation or coordination of competition policies to address 
dumping (Hoekman (1998) and Florencio (2007)), the second is the simultaneous 
implementation of competition and anti-dumping policy (Messerlin (1994)), the third is using 
competition principles in the anti-dumping investigation (Florencio (2007) and Harriott 
(2010)) and the last option is to use anti-dumping measures as a mechanism of last resort 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis (1994)). 
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In terms of the literature the indication seems to be that the most suitable option for SACU 
depends on whether the member countries see anti-dumping measures as appropriate 
measures in the context of a customs union. Depending on the answer the policy options 
available to SACU are either the gradual incorporation of competition principles into anti-
dumping rules or the prohibition of intra-SACU anti-dumping measures replaced by 
coordinated competition policies.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
The aim of the study is to evaluate the interaction between anti-dumping rules and 
competition policy in order to establish an ideal mixture of these policy instruments which 
SACU will be able to utilise. In order to attain this goal the approach in this research are 
descriptive, analytical and prescriptive. The descriptive approach is used to determine the 
current situation regarding the theory and practice of anti-dumping measures. The analytical 
approach is used to evaluate the sectoral composition of multilateral anti-dumping measures 
and the intra-regional trade patterns in SACU. The prescriptive approach is used to make 
recommendations regarding the most suitable policy options available to SACU member 
states at the national and regional level.    
 
1.7 Proposed structure 
Chapter one provides background to the research, research problem and methodology, 
literature review and the significance of the research. 
 
Chapter two focuses on the interaction between trade and competition policy. This chapter 
explores the differences and complementarities of competition and trade policy, based on the 
different objectives of these policy instruments, the measures used to enforce them and the 
role trade and competition policy currently plays in the international trading system. 
 
Chapter three is focused on the relationship between anti-dumping law and competition 
policy, especially the overlapping areas between these policies. The different approaches of 
price discrimination and predatory pricing in terms of competition policy and anti-dumping 
law are also explored. 
 
Chapter four examines the regulation of anti-dumping measures and competition policy on 
the multilateral level. The chapter briefly highlights the regulation of dumping and anti-
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dumping measures under the GATT 1994 and the WTO agreement on anti-dumping 
measures. Although the argument has been made for competition policy to also be regulated 
on a multilateral level, there has been no progress on this matter in the WTO. 
 
Chapter five analyses the implementation and importance of anti-dumping law and 
competition policy in the context of regional integration, especially in the SACU agreement 
and member countries. The discussion firstly looks at the role anti-dumping plays in a 
regional arrangement and addresses the question whether the incorporation of these trade 
policy instruments can lead to anti-competitive effects in the importing and exporting country 
markets. Next the research approaches the question of whether anti-dumping is against the 
basic premise of a regional arrangement, especially against the principles of a customs union 
in terms of the GATT 1994 and the WTO. This is still a major point of contention amongst 
the economic and legal authors in the area, without a definitive answer being provided by the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The discussion then flows to those few regional trade 
agreements which have been successful in the abolition of anti-dumping measures from intra-
regional trade. This section highlights the efforts and accomplishments of the regional 
arrangements of the European Community, European Economic Area, the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement and the Common Market of the South. 
 
Chapter six focuses on SACU as a regional trade agreement. This chapter provides a sector-
specific analysis on anti-dumping measures and SACU intra-regional imports and an 
overview of the current regional and national anti-dumping and competition policies and 
institutions in SACU. 
 
Chapter seven provides the possible theoretical policy options available for the effective 
interaction between anti-dumping and competition policies and institutions in the context of a 
regional trade arrangement.  
 
Chapter eight examines the policy options most suitable for SACU, dependant on the role 
anti-dumping and competition policies can play in the customs union. If the SACU member 
states are of the view that anti-dumping measures have no role to play on intra-regional trade 
the best option is the replace intra-regional anti-dumping measures with coordinated 
competition policies. However, if the member states are of the opinion that anti-dumping 
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measures can play an important role to regulate trade in the customs union the best option is 
to develop anti-dumping policies based on existing competition principles.  
 
Chapter nine gives a brief overview of and recommendations on the institutional 
developments that are required for the effective implementation of the chosen policy option 
on the national and regional level. 
 
The last chapter draws the overall conclusions of the research. 
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2 Trade and competition policy 
Trade liberalisation can have an impact on a range of economic policies which requires 
policy coherence among the various policy instruments. Trade and competition policies 
provide an incentive for firms and individuals to be more productive and for markets to be 
competitive and are supply side policies that can promote market efficiency and increase 
productivity growth. Trade liberalisation can generate welfare gains if markets are 
competitive and capital can move freely among trade partners (Bartok & Miroudot, 2008:4). 
The synergies between trade and competition polices can have a combined effect on 
economic efficiency and income growth. These synergies can be described as 
complementarities among the policy measures. Only through reforms in both areas can there 
be a positive impact on growth and development. The potential positive effects of trade 
liberalisation can be negated if there are anti-competitive effects in the market that allow 
firms to abuse their dominant position. Also the opening up of the domestic market will be 
negated if a domestic monopolist is replaced by a foreign monopolist. In order for countries 
to gain the full benefits associated with trade liberalisation and increased competition, trade 
and competition policies must be used to attain the same economic and development goals 
(Bartok & Miroudot, 2008:12)  
 
2.1 The interface between trade and competition policy 
In order to show the basic relationship between competition and trade policy Guasch and 
Rajapatirana (1998:1) state that ‘from a normative standpoint, trade and competition policy 
share the common economic objective of attempting to reduce barriers to the competitive 
process and thus ensuing market access and presence, promoting efficiency. But, in practice, 
however, when other objectives are introduced from pressures from interest groups, there 
could be considerable friction in the trade and competition policy nexus.’ Competition policy 
is used differently in different countries. Broadly speaking competition policy consists of 
measures and instruments governments use that determine the conditions of competition in 
the domestic market. In the narrows sense of the term competition policy is government 
measures that affect the behaviour of firms and the structure of the industry to promote 
efficiency and maximise welfare. On the other hand, trade policy is typically focused on 
removing trade barriers and increasing market access (Competition Commission of India, 
2009:1). 
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2.2 The objectives of competition policy 
National competition law can be seen as a set of rules and disciplines applicable to firms to 
restrict uncompetitive behaviour or the abuse of a firm’s dominant position in the market. 
The object of competition law is to ensure the efficient allocation of resources to maximise 
national welfare. In order to reach this objective competition law aims to ensure that the 
competitive process is not distorted by firms engaging in uncompetitive behaviour which can 
be detrimental to the social welfare of the domestic economy (Hoekman, 1998:2).  
 
According to Hoekman (1998:3) competition law is a component of competition policy. The 
author states that competition policy is a broader concept than that of competition law as a set 
of instruments and measures which governments can utilise to maintain the conditions of 
competition in a domestic market. The key difference between competition law and 
competition policy is that the first is only applicable to the behaviour of private firms, while 
the latter is applicable to the actions of both private firms and governments in the market. 
According to the World Bank (1998:2) the main objective of competition policy is to 
maintain the conditions of competition by removing the unreasonable restriction of the 
competitive process. Other associated objectives include the prevention of the abuse of a 
dominant position and the encouragement of allocative and dynamic efficiency in the market 
(World Bank, 1998:3).  
 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:2) state that the main focus of competition policy is the 
advancement of competition, which is reflected in the belief that competition is the most 
effective way in which to enhance, grow and foster economic efficiency in a domestic 
market. Competition policy is domestic in nature and is mostly concerned with national 
economic welfare within the borders of a specific country, subject to the domestic jurisdiction 
under national law without effective international adjustment and control. However, foreign 
business entities have increasingly become the target of competition policy, increasing the 
cases in which anti-competitive behaviour has cross-border effects. 
 
However, according to the World Bank (1998:8) there are various other government policies 
which can either support or adversely affect the implementation of competition policy in the 
market. These include government policies in the areas of trade, industrial, regional 
development, intellectual property, privatisation, science and technology, investment and tax. 
In order to eliminate any inconsistencies between these policies, the World Bank (1998:8) 
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recommends that the formulation and implementation of any of these policies take into 
account the principles of competition. 
 
2.3 The objectives of trade policy 
Trade policies have traditionally been focused on the facilitation of market access through a 
reduction in tariffs and quantitative restrictions and the elimination of barriers to investment 
in order to increase output, efficiency and competition, while still maintaining some form of 
protection for troubled domestic industries. Governments pursue trade policy objectives for 
various reasons: tariffs increase government revenues; certain measures can be utilised to 
protect infant-industries from mature competitors; certain foreign policy or security goals can 
be attained; and import quotas, licenses and bans can limit the consumption of a specific 
foreign good in the domestic market (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:2).  
 
Trade policy is international in nature and aims to address barriers to trade and investment 
imposed by the governments of trading partners, while competition policy aims to remove 
mostly privately erected barriers to competition. In terms of trade policy trade and investment 
liberalisation have been attained by multilateral, regional and bilateral diplomatic 
negotiations with the emphasis on market access conditions and achieving a balance among 
countries with different levels of development. The focus of trade policy is on the export 
interest of supplies which can be coupled with the enhancement of national economic welfare 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:2).  
 
Trade policy tends to be more pro-active, it can involve subsidies in different forms which 
can either target or promote a specific industry, sector or region. Trade policy can also 
increase the barriers to foreign competitors through the utilisation of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. According to Guasch and Rajapatirana (1998:4) this shows that trade policy can 
either promote or impede the economic goals associated with competition policy. 
 
2.4 The interface: complementarities 
Some authors state that there is a degree of complementarity between trade and competition 
policies (Hoekman & Holmes, 1999:10). According to Hoekman and Holmes (1999:1) trade 
and competition policy has a theoretical common foundation as a reference point in terms of 
the theory of free trade and perfectly competitive markets for the achievement of economic 
efficiency in resource utilisation. The complementarity between these policies is based in the 
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common objectives to eliminate or reduce barriers to and distortions of domestic markets. 
According to Merrett (2003:246) the reduction and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers is the most natural case of complementarity between trade and competition policy.  
 
According to Jenny (1999:10) the goals of competition policy is consistent with those of trade 
policy. Trade policy allows for the possibility of increased competition, while competition 
policy ensures that private stakeholders in the market do not distort competition. According 
to Jenny (1999:13) the complementarity between trade and competition policy lies in the 
ultimate objectives of these policies: trade policy aims to remove government created barriers 
to international trade, while competition policy aims to eliminate barriers created by private 
businesses in the market which can affect market access conditions underlying trade 
liberalisation. The potential benefits of trade liberalisation cannot be attained if there is any 
anti-competitive behaviour in a national or the international market. The objectives of both 
trade and competition policy allow for the competitive process to improve the efficiency of 
countries’ economies and not to give license to dominant firms and international cartels to 
abuse their dominant position in a market, erect barriers to entry and hinder innovation 
(Jenny, 1999:14).  
 
On their own, trade and competition policies have their limitations to facilitate market access 
and maintain the conditions of competition in the global economy. Trade policy itself cannot 
ensure market access; market access also depends on the reciprocal commitments by 
government to eliminate barriers to trade, the market strategies of domestic firms and the 
national regulatory framework of trading nations. Competition policy on its own cannot 
always ensure efficient conditions of competition, competition in any country can be affected 
by the market strategies of international firms, over which domestic competition policy does 
not always have effective jurisdiction (Jenny, 1999:14).  
 
2.5 The interface: differences 
The relationship between trade and competition policy is complex due to the overlapping 
effects these policies can have. While competition policy aims to reduce the power of 
domestic producers, trade policy tries to ensure the market power of domestic producers by 
shifting economic rents from foreigner firms to the domestic government, consumers and 
producers. In this sense competition and trade policy are working towards overlapping 
purposes which are at odds with one another (Cadot, Grether & De Melio, 2000:7).  
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A number of differences between trade policy and competition policy have been identified. 
Trade policy addresses issues at the border, deals with government-imposed barriers to trade, 
is the subject of most multilateral and bilateral negotiations and operates under both national 
and international law. Competition policy on the other hand addresses issues pertaining to 
competition within a country’s borders, deals with private sector barriers to competition, 
operates mainly under national law and there have only been minimal multilateral and 
bilateral negotiations on competition policy issues (Waverman, 1998:31-32).  
 
Merrett (2003:242) divided the debate surrounding the interaction between competition and 
trade policy into three main areas of contention.  
 The first is that trade policy liberalisation can be frustrated by a failure to enforce 
efficient domestic competition policy. The benefits trade liberalisation can have for 
consumers can be eroded by restrictive behaviour and practices by domestic firms in 
the liberalising market. Merrett (2003: 242) recognises that the competition policy 
choices of a government can alter market access conditions in the domestic market in 
a similar manner than tariffs can affect domestic market access. 
 The second area of contention is that trade policy measures can in turn have highly 
uncompetitive effects. Import protection including tariffs and non-tariff barriers can 
reduce competition in the domestic market and reduce consumer welfare (Merrett, 
2003:242).   According to Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:2) an active trade policy 
redistributes income among the different segments in the market by protecting 
specific industries and the factors of production employed in these sectors. However, 
this protection is often done in a very inefficient manner. Thus trade policy is seen as 
being inconsistent with the underlying objectives of competition policy. The 
incompatibility can be illustrated by the following: while competition policy aims to 
protect competition and economic efficiency in the domestic market, trade policy 
aims to protect the competitors and the factors of production employed in the 
domestic market.  
 The last area of contention is that government regulation can also frustrate the 
objectives of both competition and trade policy. Through government failures in the 
effective enforcement of regulations, obstacles to trade liberalisation and improved 
conditions of competition can be created (Merrett, 2003:242). 
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Government policy should aim to protect the competitive process so that any excess profits 
can be eliminated through competition among firms. Due to the possible distortive effect an 
actively pursued trade policy can have on domestic competition, Hoekman and Mavroidis 
(1994:4) calls for a mechanism which will allow government to consider the competitive 
effects of actively pursuing a specific trade policy objective. The more restrictive the trade 
policy regime, the more important the role of competition policy to reduce any negative 
welfare effects caused by the restriction of the competitive markets. However, using 
competition policy to try and offset the possible distortion of domestic competition created by 
an active trade policy will not necessarily enhance welfare, being only a second best solution. 
The preferable policy option is to minimise the extent to which trade policy reduces the 
contestability of the domestic markets through a liberal external policy stance (Hoekman & 
Mavroidis, 1994:2).  Hoekman and Holmes (1999:10) also see a liberal trade policy as the 
most effective and efficient competition policy instrument available to any national 
government to attain this objective. This is because import competition is important for 
market discipline, especially in countries with highly concentrated markets. 
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3. The relationship between anti-dumping measures as a trade policy tool and 
 competition policy 
Bayliss and Malhotra (2006:4) state that the objectives of anti-dumping and competition 
policy are at odds with one another: while competition policy aims to protect the consumer 
through limiting anti-competitive behaviour by firms and governments, the goal of anti-
dumping measures is to protect domestic firms and the factors of production employed in the 
domestic industry.   
  
Dumping is mainly associated with two forms of anti-competitive behaviour: price 
discrimination and predatory pricing. In order for dumping to exist in the first case the firm 
must be able to segment the international market into different categories according to their 
willingness to pay different prices. Furthermore the firm must be able to charge a higher price 
in the domestic market and a lower price in the foreign market, based on the difference in the 
elasticity of demand. In the case of predatory pricing the firm must have the intent and ability 
to price a product in the foreign market low enough to eliminate all competitors and deter any 
new entrants into the market in order to establish a monopoly (Florencio, 2007:18). In 
accordance with international trade law, actions by private firms, including predatory pricing 
or price discrimination can be classified as the unfair trade practice of dumping. This is due 
to Article VI of the GATT 1994, pertaining to anti-dumping measures, which allows for 
countries to impose anti-dumping duties when goods are sold in a foreign market at a price 
which is lower than the price in the domestic market of the exporting firm. However, not all 
cases of price discrimination and predatory pricing will incur a penalty for anti-competitive 
behaviour in terms of competition policy. According to Mathis (2005:20) this shows that 
pricing strategies which are not necessarily considered to be unfair trade within borders can 
be considered unfair trade practices across borders.  
 
3.1 Overlap between anti-dumping and competition policy 
The goal of competition policy is to promote and preserve the competitive environment in the 
domestic market in which products are traded within and across the national borders through 
restricting anti-competitive behaviour which has the effect of lessening competition. This 
includes the abuse of a firm’s dominant position in the market, mergers and collusion among 
firms. Anti-dumping law is limited in terms of the conduct which it prohibits. Anti-dumping 
only prohibits dumping when it causes or threatens to cause material injury to the domestic 
industry. In order to establish whether there is the justification to implement anti-dumping 
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measures the investigating authority only considers the harm to the domestic producers, thus 
safeguarding the welfare of the domestic producer. On the other hand competition policy 
prohibits anti-competitive behaviour which can lessen consumer welfare in the domestic 
market (Harriott, 2010:2-6). According to Alavi and Ahamat (2004:80) in the injury and 
causal link investigation there is a lack of considering some competitive principles, including 
the inefficiency or efficiency of the complainant firm or the market power of the exporting 
firm. During the investigation process there is also a lack of considering any query about the 
industry configurations, the existence of entry barriers, market power and other conditions of 
competition in either the home or export market. 
 
In a comparison between anti-dumping and competition policy Spinanger (2002:16) found 
that there is a vast difference between these two policies in different areas: 
 While anti-dumping measures aims to protect domestic competitors, competition 
policy aims to protect domestic competition; 
 Anti-dumping protects domestic competitors mostly from competition by foreign 
firms, while competition policy generally does not distinguish between anti-
competitive behaviour by foreign and domestic firms; 
 In an anti-dumping investigation the domestic authority does not investigate the 
motive which drives the decision to dump, while motivation and predatory intent is 
one of the important considerations during an anti-competitive investigation.  
 
From a legal perspective anti-dumping measures do not prohibit firms to take actions which 
would otherwise be prohibited under competition policy. This includes quantitative 
restrictions, resale price maintenance and price fixing. However, anti-dumping does prohibit 
competition through price differentiation that is legitimate under competition policy (Tavares, 
2001:7). Dumping is not per se a violation under competition policy. According to Nordstrom 
(2009:8) dumping is only a contravention of competition principles if the dumper has a 
dominant position in the market and abuses this dominant position, through selling below 
average cost, in an effort to remove any domestic and foreign competitors from the market or 
pre-empt any other competitors from entering the market. Tavares (2001:7) also highlights 
that from an economic perspective these policies also have conflicting objectives which can 
lead to conflicting solutions. Anti-dumping as a trade remedy protects a domestic industry 
from injury caused by import-competing foreign firms, competition policy on the other hand 
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aims to promote consumer welfare and productive efficiency by ensuring the contestability of 
the domestic market in which import-competition is a very important element. According to 
Finger and Zlate (2003:15) competition principles are more efficient in identifying those 
circumstances under which government intervention in the market will serve the national 
interest of the domestic market. 
 
Tavares (2001:11) states that the difference between competition policy and anti-dumping as 
a trade remedy is highlighted in a communication by the United States government to the 
WTO which states: ‘Contrary to the assumptions of some economists, the anti-dumping rules 
are not included as a remedy for the predatory pricing practices of firms or as a remedy for 
any other private anti-competitive practices typically condoned by competition laws. Rather, 
the anti-dumping rules are a trade remedy which WTO members have agreed is necessary to 
the maintenance of the multilateral trading system, without this and other trade remedies 
there could have been no agreement on broader GATT and later WTO packages of market-
opening agreements, especially given imperfections which remain in the multilateral trading 
system.’ This means that the main goal of anti-dumping measures is to act as a safety valve in 
an open trading system to ensure the on going support for furthering trade liberalisation, even 
in those countries where there are industries which do not want import competition from 
foreign firms (US Government, 1998:2).  
 
Another area in which there is a clear distinction between these policies is in the manner the 
policies is enforced. Anti-dumping is defined under the assumption that the domestic industry 
is faced by a foreign monopolist or international cartel which causes or will cause harm to the 
domestic industry. However, during the anti-dumping investigation this assumption does not 
get tested, the data collected during the investigation process is limited to import figures, 
price comparisons and the performance of the domestic industry. During the investigation 
there is no room to take factors like barriers to entry, market power and other conditions of 
competition in the domestic and foreign market into account. The investigation process in a 
complaint of anti-competitive behaviour differs in that the starting point in any investigation 
is the proper definition of the market and the identification of the conditions of competition 
(Tavares, 2001:7-8).  
 
In anti-dumping law the market is defined in a completely different manner and much 
broader than is the case under competition policy, as the geographically relevant market 
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under anti-dumping law is only the domestic market of the importing country. Product 
markets are also not defined in terms of the demand characteristics of the consumers in the 
market which is the case under competition policy. The product market is defined as an 
industrial concept with the technical similarities of a good rather than the substitutability of 
the good which is the method used by consumers to define the product market (Knorr, 
2004:8-9).  
 
According to Knorr (2004:10) anti-dumping law has serious procedural deficiencies by 
offering various means for discriminating against foreign producers. This includes the 
availability of different methods to calculate the export price and normal value and a partial 
analysis of the effect of dumping on the importing country. There is also no room for 
considering the benefits associated with dumping, mainly due to lower prices, for consumers 
and the competitiveness of domestic firms. The significant difference in the procedural 
requirements of anti-dumping law, compared with those of competition policy, also show that 
the potential exists for substantial discrimination. The investigating authority generally 
accepts the definition of the market as that of the complaining domestic industry without 
conducting an independent analysis of the applicable market. There is also no room for 
demonstrating that the dumping firm has a dominant position in the importing market (Knorr, 
2004:11).  
 
3.2 Price discrimination under anti-dumping and competition policy 
National and international price discrimination exists when a firm charge different prices for 
a like product in a single-segmented market or between separated markets. The monopolist is 
able to maximise its profits through charging different prices in the different markets due to a 
difference in the elasticity of demand (Nicolaides, 1990:118). The firms is able to sell at a 
higher price in those markets where the consumers are willing and able to pay more for the 
product and charge a lower price in the market where the consumers are unwilling and unable 
to pay such a high price (Harriott, 2010:6).  
 
There are various business reasons for a firm to practice price discrimination in the market 
(Marceau, 1994:12): 
 When a firm with market power enters a new market which is divided by tariffs, 
transport costs and technical standards, the firm might want to maintain lower prices 
in the new market which is more competitive; 
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 If a firm expands into a new geographical area and prices are controlled by a cartel or 
government in the first market, the reduction in price associated with an increase in 
output might only be possible in the new market; and 
 If a firm is present in two markets, but prices are regulated in one market through 
cartels or by government policy, a firm may only be able to lower its prices in the 
market where prices are not controlled when there is excess capacity. 
 
Under competition policy, price discrimination with an adverse affect on competition and 
consumer welfare is prohibited. This is normally referred to as unfair or discriminatory 
pricing. However, if it can be shown that price discrimination is adopted to meet the needs of 
competition and does not affect the conditions of competition in an adverse manner, price 
discrimination will not attract any sanctions. However, under anti-dumping law every form of 
price discrimination is prohibited. Price discrimination is investigated under the parameters of 
injury to the domestic industry and once dumping and injury are established, broader 
economic concerns, like consumer welfare, are not taken into account (Competition 
Commission of India, 2004:12). 
   
In order for dumping to exist in terms of international price discrimination the firm must be 
able to divide its market into the domestic and foreign markets with a different willingness to 
pay for a similar product. The firm must also have sufficient market power in order to 
influence the price of the product and the price elasticity of demand needs to be higher in the 
export market than in the home market. If this takes place the firm might be able to charge a 
lower price in the export market than the domestic market. If a firm can successfully segment 
the market in order to price discriminate, Tharakan (2000:73) states that the negative welfare 
affect on the aggregate economic welfare will then be present in the domestic industry, due to 
consumers paying artificially high prices. However, there can also be some adverse effects on 
the producer surplus and employment in the foreign market (Tharakan, 2000:73).  
 
Florencio (2007:18), states that the global welfare affects of price discrimination is uncertain. 
Price discrimination can be welfare enhancing by promoting an overall increase in output as a 
result of the opportunity to sell a product at different prices in different markets. It has long 
been recognised that price discrimination will not necessarily have an anti-competitive affect 
on a market. The ability of a firm to ask different prices in different markets is not necessarily 
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an abuse of market power that will harm competition in the domestic industry. This can just 
be a natural consequence of a highly competitive market which can increase the contestability 
of the markets in a country. Whether the net effect of price discrimination is welfare 
enhancing depends on the trade-off between the increased consumer welfare and the 
competitiveness of the intermediate users of a good and the possible loss of an uncompetitive 
domestic industry.    
 
3.3 Predatory pricing under anti-dumping and competition policy 
Predatory pricing can be defined as a monopolist selling its product at prices which do not 
maximise profits, thus selling at a price where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost 
(Nicolaides, 1990:122). A monopolist can be motivated to sell at prices lower than marginal 
cost and forego profit maximisation in the short-run in order to discourage competitors from 
entering the market in order to gain profits in the long-run. Predatory pricing is the most 
commonly used argument for the justification of anti-dumping actions. In the context of 
dumping predation implies the ability of a firm to export a product at a low price with the 
intention to eliminate competitors and deter new entrants in the importing country to obtain 
monopoly power (Tharakan, 2000:82). The monopolist will then be able to recoup previous 
losses by the exploitation of its market power, increasing prices in the market of the 
importing country (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:3). 
 
According to Florencio (2007:18) predatory pricing requires an analysis of three elements: 
determining whether the price of a good is at a non-remuneration level, whether the firm has 
a dominant position in the market, and whether the firm will be able to eliminate competitors 
from the market and subsequently be able to charge highly uncompetitive prices. In order to 
address predatory pricing under competition policy the competition authority first needs to 
define the relevant market. The market definition traditionally includes all the existing and 
potential suppliers of the specific good in the market. The market definition is mostly limited 
by a geographical component. This reflects the possibility that the market can be restricted 
through the existence of natural barriers, like transportation costs or tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade (Knorr, 2004:6). In the next step of the competition investigation the 
authority must determine whether the firm accused of predation has market power or is 
dominant in the domestic market. A firm can be considered to be dominant if there are either 
no competitors or no substantial competition in the defined market. Factors which the 
investigating authority will consider in order to establish dominance, including the market 
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share of the firm in question, its financial position, its linkages to other firms, entry barriers in 
the market, actual and potential competition in the market and the availability of substitutes 
to the relevant product in the market (Knorr, 2004:7). The last step in the determination is the 
establishment whether the dominant firm has abused its market power by practicing predatory 
pricing. In order to determine a predator pricing-suspicion the authority will compare the 
sales price of the product in dispute with the production costs of the product (Knorr, 2004:7). 
 
A comparison between these elements and the anti-dumping provision in the GATT 1994 and 
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement reveals that predatory pricing and anti-dumping policy 
are intrinsically at odds with one another (Florencio, 2007:18). The table below shows that 
there are various differences between predatory pricing, governed by competition law and 
dumping governed by international trade law. 
 
Table 2: Comparing predatory pricing and dumping 
Predatory Pricing Dumping 
Requires a firm to be dominant in the market 
Dominance not a requirement, but imports must 
be above a certain minimum threshold 
Intention to eliminate competition from the 
market 
Intent to required 
Predatory pricing takes place when sales are 
below variable costs 
Dumping takes place when the sales price/export 
price is below the normal value in the home 
market 
Predation must effect competition in the 
market adversely 
Dumping must cause or threaten material injury 
to the domestic industry of the like product in 
the importing market 
Punitive remedies available Anti-dumping duties are remedial measures 
Governed by national legislation and subject 
to domestic courts 
Governed by WTO law incorporated into national 
laws and subject to the WTO dispute settlement 
process 
Source: Competition Commission of India (2009:1) 
 
In order to equate predatory pricing with dumping, defined as an export price below normal 
value of a like product in the domestic market, the normal value should be considered as an 
adequate remuneration level for the firm, like average cost. However, the definition of normal 
value as the price in ‘the ordinary course of trade’ shows that this is not the case. A further 
incompatibility is due to predation requiring proof of dominance and a firms ability to recoup 
its losses once existing competitors have been eliminated from the market. During an anti-
dumping investigation these elements need not be considered. This has led most authors 
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(Florencio, 2007:19; Tavares, 2001:) to state that the only justification for the retention of 
anti-dumping measures in trade policy is as a safety valve to ensure further future trade 
liberalisation. 
 
Hoekman (1998:9) holds the view that current anti-dumping practices have very little to do 
with the need to address predatory behaviour in the domestic market. In the real world 
predation is the exception rather than the rule. According to Hoekman and Mavroidis 
(1994:3) the justification of anti-dumping action in the case of predatory pricing requires the 
dominant firm to establish global dominance in the production of the product or lobby 
government to pursue a policy stance which supports or tolerate entry restrictions. Nicolaides 
(1990:123) states that the monopolist will only be able to abuse its dominant position in the 
domestic market of the importing country if there are no alternative domestic or foreign 
suppliers of the specific product in the domestic market and if there are existing barriers to 
entry which reduces the possible contestability of the market. Both these are very difficult to 
establish in practice (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:3).  
 
Nordstrom (2009:116) has identified other barriers to a firm establishing an international 
monopoly, including the difficulty of preventing consumers to stockpile goods during the 
predatory pricing phase, the need for quick exit levels and high elasticity’s of demand for the 
dumped product to prevent consumers switching to a substitute product. The existence of 
international competition is one of the most significant barriers to the establishment of an 
international monopolist – the monopolist must not only drive the domestic competitors from 
the importing market, but also foreign competitors. The cumulative effect of all these barriers 
leads to the conclusion that the establishment of an international monopolist through 
predatory pricing is highly unlikely (Nordstrom, 2009:116). Nordstrom (2009:117) states that 
anti-dumping measures can more likely be used to protect the domestic industry against 
sporadic dumping.  
 
Sporadic dumping means that dumping is not sustained over a long period of time but rather 
takes place over short time period intervals. During the periods of sporadic dumping the 
producers in the domestic market are forced to either exit the market or temporarily restrict 
production to protect themselves against lower cost imports until the dumping firm leaves the 
market. The higher costs associated with the domestic producers’ attempt to retain their 
market share during the time of the dumping will be passed on to the consumers through 
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higher prices. If the lost in welfare for the consumers outweighs the benefit of the sporadic 
dumping anti-dumping measures can be justified from a consumer welfare perspective that 
the costs associated with the sporadic dumping has a long-term impact on consumers 
(Nordstrom, 2009:118). 
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4. Multilateral legal framework 
On the multilateral level there are comprehensive trade policy rules governing the 
implementation of anti-dumping measures by WTO member countries under the GATT 1994 
and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. Whether competition policy should be regulated on 
the multilateral level is still a matter of contention among the WTO member states.  
 
Although competition issues have not directly been included into the multilateral legal 
framework, Merrett (2003:246) identifies various multilateral trade provisions in the GATT 
1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which have an impact on 
competition policy or market distortion issues.  
 Article II of the GATT 1994 states the fundamental obligation of the WTO is to 
ensure the national treatment of goods traded by WTO members. In terms of this 
obligation a WTO member must treat import products the same as domestic products 
once it has entered the border. According to Merrett (2003:247) national treatment is 
fundamentally about maintaining the competitive conditions in the domestic market 
which is independent on actual trade effects.  
 Article VI of the GATT 1994 pertains to the implementation of anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing duties on imports which harm the domestic industry. 
According to Merrett (2003:246) anti-dumping measures, as a trade remedy to protect 
domestic firms from import-competing foreign firms, are inherently anti-competitive.  
 State trading enterprises provided for in Article XVII of the GATT 1994 also create 
serious obstacles to competition due to the benefits these enterprises receive from 
exclusive or special privileges and the obligations imposed on the conduct of WTO 
member countries.  
 In the GATS Article VIII monopoly suppliers to not abuse their monopoly position 
when they are competing in the supply of services stemming from their monopoly 
rights, while Article IX allows for certain business practices of service providers, 
other than those falling in article VIII to restrain competition.  
 
According to Merrett (2003:248) these provisions either create the inherent obligation on 
WTO members to implement competition policy or create loopholes in competition policies 
disguised as trade policy requirements.   
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4.1 Anti-dumping law under GATT 1994 and the WTO agreement 
Since 1 January 1995 dumping and the implementation of anti-dumping measures have been 
regulated on the multilateral level by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and under the WTO by 
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, generally referred to as the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. Article VI of the 
GATT 1994 contains basic provisions relating anti-dumping measures and the 
implementation of these measures, while the Anti-Dumping Agreement contains detailed 
provisions regarding the substantive and procedural requirements associated with these 
measures (Czako et al, 2003:2). These legal instruments must be read and applied in 
conjunction with one another. The GATT 1994/WTO does not prohibit dumping; dumping is 
only condemned if it causes harm to the domestic industry of the like product. The WTO 
cannot prohibit dumping as dumping is an action by private firms in the exporting market. 
The WTO only regulates the action of governments of member countries and not the 
behaviour of private firms. This shows the inability of the WTO to prohibit dumping (Knorr, 
2004:7). 
 
Both the GATT 1994 and the WTO agreement provide specific conditions which must be 
adhered to by the affected country to be successful with the implementation of an anti-
dumping duty. There are three main requirements which must be in place for a country to 
justify the utilisation of anti-dumping protection: dumping must be present, there must be 
material injury or the threat of material injury to the domestic industry of the like product and 
the dumping must be the cause of the harm to the domestic industry (Knorr, 2004:7). Article 
VI defines dumping as the introduction of a specific good by a firm into the commerce of 
another country at an export price which is lower than the normal value of the good.  
 
The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement introduced some procedural changes to Article VI of 
the GATT 1994 which redefined the circumstances under which anti-dumping investigation 
can be taken, the method of calculating anti-dumping duties and procedures. The WTO 
agreement indicates that the profits, selling and administrative costs should be based on 
actual data. If actual data is not available, data from other exporters of a similar product can 
be used. However, even under the WTO agreement importing countries still have a wide 
discretion to construct export prices and the normal value and to find differences in export 
prices and domestic costs. The provisions of the agreement have also removed some biases 
which were present under the provisions of the GATT, including the overstatement of 
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domestic costs by allowing the use of a weighted average normal value in the home market 
with the weighted average of all the comparable exports, or on a transaction to transaction 
basis (Gausch & Rajapatirana, 1998:9). When exporters from more than one country are 
involved in an anti-dumping investigation the home county can take the cumulative effect of 
the injury into account. Cumulation is allowed if the share of each exporter exceeds more 
than three percent of the importing country market. The agreement also includes a de minimis 
requirement for when an anti-dumping investigation needs to come to an end. According to 
the agreement an anti-dumping investigation must be halted if the margin between the cost of 
production and the export price is less than two percent. One of the most significant changes 
the WTO agreement introduced into the multilateral law is a sunset review clause. In terms of 
this clause any anti-dumping measure automatically expires after it has been implemented for 
five years, unless a review shows that the dumping and/or injury to the domestic industry will 
continue if the anti-dumping measure is allowed to expire. This provision has enforced the 
idea of anti-dumping measures as only a temporary trade remedy (Gausch & Rajapatirana, 
1998:10).   
 
Although all members of the WTO are also a party to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it is not 
mandatory for all WTO member countries to have a domestic legal framework in place or 
take action when dumping has taken place. However, if a member country does decide to 
implement an anti-dumping measure the measure must be implemented in a manner which is 
consistent with the rules specific in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement which has been 
incorporated into the domestic laws of a WTO member country. The implementation of an 
anti-dumping duty by a WTO member country is thus subject to various conditions: an 
investigation in accordance with the procedural requirement set out in the WTO agreement 
and that the investigation found evidence of imports being dumped, the domestic industry in 
the like product has suffered harm and the harm to the domestic industry was caused by the 
dumping in the domestic market (Czako et al, 2003:3). If, at the conclusion of the 
investigation the domestic authority finds in favour of implementing an anti-dumping 
measure, the Anti-Dumping Agreement allows for the implementation of provisional 
measures, definitive anti-dumping duties and price undertakings as instruments to remedy the 
injury caused by dumping. However, these measures can only be applied on a temporary 
basis and to the extent to correct the harm suffered by the domestic industry.   
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4.2 The lack of multilateral competition policy 
Currently there is no clear consensus among WTO member states on whether competition 
policy should be included in the multilateral trade negotiations (Hoekman & Holmes, 
1999:1).  
 
According to Paasman (1999:30-31) various attempts have been made to negotiate and 
establish multilateral rules on competition over the last few decades, but all attempts have 
failed: 
 In 1948 the Havana Charter on the International Trade Organisation (ITO) included a 
section on competition in an attempt to prevent firms from engaging in practices that 
could adversely affect international trade and market access or create and nurture 
monopolies. However, the Charter was never ratified and the ITO never came into 
existence mainly due to opposition from the United States Senate that feared the ITO 
would greatly interfere with sovereignty. 
 At a meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1953 
an international convention on competition was proposed. The aim of the convention 
was to create a mechanism for countries to challenge any anti-competitive behaviour 
that affect international trade. Once again firms in the United States greatly opposed 
this convention due to the strict anti-trust policies already in existence in the country. 
 In 1972 an expert group was established by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) to identify multilateral rules and principles on 
restrictive business practices. As a result of the work done by the expert group a 
resolution was adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
However, the resolution has no binding effect among member countries. 
 Under the GATT various attempts have been made to establish multilateral 
competition principles and policies. In 1955 rules that allow for ad-hoc notification 
and consultation on conflicts of interest between countries due to anti-competitive 
practices was adopted. However, these rules have never been applied in practice. In 
the 1960s and 1970s discussions on multilateral competition rules were resumed 
without any clear results.  
 
After the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore 1996 the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy was established to determine the role the 
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WTO and the multilateral trading system can play in the regulation of competition in member 
countries. The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of 2001 recognised the importance of 
competition policy to international trade and development and the need for capacity building 
and technical assistance on this issue in developing and least-developed countries. This 
created the need for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition 
policy to trade and development. According to the Declaration, WTO member countries 
reached consensus to negotiate competition policy issues on the multilateral level and 
instruction was given to the Working Group to focus on the clarification of the core 
principles of competition policies to be negotiated, the modalities for voluntary cooperation 
and to identify capacity-building projects in developing and least-developed countries (WTO 
Ministerial Declaration (2001).  
 
The figure below shows the approach of the United States, the European Union and various 
developing countries to the proposed multilateral negotiations. The United States is greatly 
opposed to include competition issues in multilateral negotiations, while the member 
countries of the European Union are supportive of the proposal if the scope of negotiations is 
limited to intergovernmental procedures. Various developing countries have submitted 
opinions on the issue with countries divided between those supporting the proposal and those 
strongly opposed to the idea. 
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Figure 3: Approaches to the multilateral negotiations: the US, EU and developing 
countries 
 
Source: Paasman (1999) 
 
In 2004 the General Council of the WTO decided that the multilateral role competition policy 
can play in international trade will no longer form part of the Doha Development Agenda. 
Since the decision the work of the Working Group has come to a complete standstill 
(Interaction between trade and competition policy, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Agrees that some business practices may restrict market access and trade and 
therefore competition principles should be included in trade negotiations 
•Not in favour of international competition rules: 
•WTO negotiations on competition rules will require a compromose with less 
agricultural reform, better rules of origin and more strict dispute settlement 
rules. 
•Fear of inferior rules becoming the standard if competition policies are 
harmonised among WTO members. 
•Reluctance to replace anti-dumping laws with international competition rules. 
United States 
•Promoting the idea of estalbishing multilateral rules on competition policy,  
but with a narrow scope of application: 
•Negotiations must be limited to create intergovernmental procedures which 
have implementation similar to the rules in the GATT 1994. 
•A progressive process to negotiations: 
•Stage one: implementation of domestic competition laws 
•Stage two: Identifying common rules and principles 
•Stage three: Framework for cooperation among domestic competition 
agencies 
European Union 
•Different approaches: 
•Some countries are opposed to a binding agreement on competition and even 
opposed the creation of a Working Group at the Singapore Conference in 
1996. Countries opposed to the proposal include India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Kenya and Egypt. 
•Countries which are more supportive to the idea of multilateral competition 
rules negotions include South Africa and countries from Latin America. 
Developing 
countries 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
5. Anti-dumping measures in regional trade agreements 
The main objective of a regional trade arrangement is the removal of barriers on intra-
regional trade (Prusa & Skeath, 2001). However, the elimination of intra-regional tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers can create new demands for the protective effects of trade remedies, 
especially anti-dumping measures (Teh, et al, 2007). Due to this new demand for the 
protection of domestic industries, anti-dumping measures are often used as a tool to restrict 
foreign imports into a domestic market under a regional trade arrangement. Thus anti-
dumping measures are used as a kind of fall back or safety valve when countries experience 
difficulty due to increased trade liberalisation and improved access to domestic markets 
(Spinanger, 2002:2). 
 
Anti-dumping measures are seen as being inefficient, disadvantage the producers and 
exporters of the specific product on which it is imposed, reduces consumer welfare and have 
a negative impact on the industrial users of those products in the importing market. This has 
led to some countries calling for the replacement of anti-dumping measures through the 
utilisation of competition principles (Voon, 2009:5), especially in terms of regional trade 
arrangements (Economic Law Practice, 2009:19).  
 
According to Bilal and Olarreaga (1998:158) for trade liberalisation in a regional 
arrangement to be effective the use of trade remedies, especially anti-dumping must be 
limited or preferable removed from the regional agreement. Although the retention of anti-
dumping measures can be justified as a measure to protect a domestic industry against 
predation, the authors see anti-dumping as being an inherent protectionist device which is 
justified through its reliance on the rhetoric of protecting fair trade. Any potential benefits 
trading partners can receive through the conclusion of a regional trade agreement can be 
withered away by the use of anti-dumping measures among the trading partners. Bilal and 
Olarreaga (1998:159) also states that anti-dumping measures entail anti-competitive biases: 
anti-dumping measures generally distort competition because these measures target the most 
efficient foreign supplier in the domestic market. Anti-dumping is also an instrument which 
actually favours the firms with a dominant position in the domestic market through the 
standing requirement and is only applied if the firms with market power want to remove 
foreign suppliers from the domestic market. 
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Teh et al (2007:11) state that the removal of anti-dumping measures from a regional trade 
agreement may not necessarily lead to an increase in welfare. There is the possibility that the 
abolition of anti-dumping measures can lead to negative trade diversion effects which 
outweigh the positive effects of trade creation among member states. Eliminating anti-
dumping measures on intra-regional member states can create the preference for intra-
regional goods leading to increased trade among the member countries of the regional trade 
agreement. However, the preference for intra-regional goods can be at the expense of cheaper 
sources of imports from non-member countries. This creates the danger that the expansion of 
intra-regional trade, can lead to the increased use of anti-dumping measures against non-
member country imports. Thus there is the risk of trade diversion: the removal of anti-
dumping measures on intra-regional trade looks good for increased intra-regional trade, but 
can lead to intra-regional imports purely being substituted for cheaper imports from non-
member countries. In other words measures implemented with the aim of increasing 
economic efficiency can actually have the opposite effect (Teh et al, 2007:13)     
 
5.1 The purpose of anti-dumping measures in regional trade agreements 
Anti-dumping measures are commonly justified as a means to take action against trade 
partners which engage in unfair trade practices which cause material injury to the domestic 
industry of the importing country (Teh et al, 2007:4). Anti-dumping duties enable a country 
to temporarily increase trade protection available to a domestic industry when a trading 
partner sells a product below its normal value in the importing market (Teh et al, 2007:3). 
The premise behind this flexibility measure built into a regional arrangement highlights the 
two main reasons for retaining anti-dumping measures in a regional trade agreement (Teh et 
al, 2007:4). The first relates to the political economy of protectionism and the second the 
political demand for protectionism in regional trade liberalisation.  
 
In terms of the political economy of protectionism Teh et al (2007:4) makes the argument 
that anti-dumping measures in regional agreements are required to satisfy the bureaucracies, 
which administers the use of these measures, to protect the import-competing sectors in the 
domestic market. The reduction of import duties provides import-competing sectors with an 
incentive to lobby government for protection against foreign competitors through any means 
possible. Although anti-dumping measures are administered by bureaucracies, normally 
isolated from political pressure, they can be influenced indirectly by the laws and regulations 
which govern their work. Anti-dumping measures are also inherently biased in favour of 
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domestic industries, because measures are channelled through complaints regarding the 
excess of import competition in the domestic market and not the absence of foreign 
competing firms (Teh et al, 2007:8). Anti-dumping measures can also be incorporated into 
regional agreements as a strategic policy tool to affect the terms of trade of a trading partner. 
If countries aim to achieve free trade through regional integration, there is always the concern 
that a trading partner will use alternative instruments, like subsidies, to circumvent the 
achievement of free trade. Thus anti-dumping measures can be used as a safety valve to offset 
any strategic use of policies by other countries to reduce domestic welfare (Hoekman, 
1998:10). 
 
The second reason for retaining anti-dumping provisions lies in the ability of these measures 
to meet political demands for protectionism if trade liberalisation is perceived as a threat to 
the domestic economy. Trade liberalisation is inherently associated with some adjustment 
costs, which if not managed, can lead to the political demand to protect the domestic industry 
against these costs. These adjustment costs can be defined as those costs involved in the 
transition from one state to another or transferring resources from one sector to another, 
including labour and capital adjustment costs. Including anti-dumping provisions in a 
regional trade agreement can possibly deflate any political pressure which may arise during 
the regional trade liberalisation process. An anti-dumping duty has a cushioning effect, 
providing a specific set of condition under which regional liberalisation can be temporarily 
suspended or reversed. Although the temporary reversal of the trade liberalisation process can 
lead to short-term welfare losses, the increased trade liberalisation efforts these measures can 
facilitate may lead to long-term welfare gains which can outweigh any short-term losses. 
Anti-dumping measures thus have a very important purpose to fulfil in a regional trade 
agreement as a safety valve to rally the necessary political support to conclude any trade 
agreement under negotiation (Teh et al, 2007:5).  
 
Although anti-dumping measures can fulfil a specific function in a regional trade agreement, 
the question remains whether these measures are the best available option to address the 
circumvention of trade liberalisation by trading partners. Hoekman (1998:10) states that the 
suitability of anti-dumping as a strategic policy tool depends on the source of the problem: 
are anti-dumping measures utilised to address high trade barriers or industrial policy 
measures implemented in the domestic market of the exporting firm?  
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In the case of foreign firms benefitting from high trade barriers in their own domestic market, 
anti-dumping measures can be used as an effective policy tool to put pressure on foreign 
governments to remove domestic trade barriers protecting local producers. This argument has 
widely been used to justify the use of anti-dumping as an instrument for offsetting market 
access restrictions in the home market of the exporting firm which enables foreign firms to 
dump in the importing market. This creates the gap for anti-dumping measures to function as 
an instrument to correct competitive differences created by governments in different trading 
partners (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:25).  
 
On the other hand Hoekman (1998:12) states that if the source of the problem is applicable 
industrial policies, the use of anti-dumping measures as a strategic policy tool is inefficient.  
This includes the use of anti-dumping measures to address subsidies and state-trading 
enterprises in the market of the exporting firm. In this case the use of anti-dumping measures 
can lead to a decrease in welfare of the consumers in the importing country without providing 
a real motivation for foreign governments to change their protective ways.  
 
5.2 Anti-competitive effect of anti-dumping rules 
The debate surrounding the validity of retaining anti-dumping measures in a regional trade 
arrangement can be summarised by the following question by Spinanger (2002) and plausible 
reactions from Finger (1993) and Lloyd (2005). In an effort to explain that the incorporation 
of anti-dumping measures into regional trade agreements are against the basic premise of 
trade liberalisation and improved market access Spinanger (2002:2) asked the following 
question: why should the initial step by countries to decrease trade barriers and improve their 
integration into the world economy immediately be accompanied by measures to ensure that 
the integration process be negated by maintaining anti-dumping measures in the regional 
agreements? On this question Finger (1993:56) would probably have responded that anti-
dumping measures are ‘a trouble-making diplomacy, stupid economics and unprincipled 
law’, while Lloyd (2005:73) would have answered that ‘anti-dumping is the fox put in charge 
of the henhouse: trade restrictions certified by GATT. The fox is clever enough not only to 
eat the hens, but also to convince the farmer that it is the way things ought to be. Anti-
dumping is ordinary protection with a grand public relations program.’  
 
Maintaining anti-dumping measures in regional trade agreements can have two diverse 
effects. The first is that as liberalisation among the regional partners increase, the member 
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countries can increase the utilisation of anti-dumping measures among member countries, 
decreasing the intended benefit of liberalisation in the first place. The second consequence is 
that the member countries of the regional agreement increasingly implement anti-dumping 
measures against imports from non-member countries as regional integration among the 
member states deepens (Spinanger, 2002:11).   
 
Tavares (2001:15) states that anti-dumping measures can have various unintended 
consequences, which imply welfare costs for domestic consumers which are higher than the 
costs associated with traditional trade barriers. Anti-dumping duties increase the price of 
imported goods, can reduce the competitiveness of the domestic market and provide 
incentives for collusion among firms, trade diversion and the transfer of protection rents to 
trading partners.  In a regional trade configuration the utilisation of anti-dumping policy can 
have a significant impact on the competitiveness of trade within the region. Anti-dumping 
rules are seen as being inefficient and disadvantage producers, exporters, importers and 
consumers (Hoekman, 1998:3). The argument has been made that anti-dumping rules are 
inherently protectionist not just by being included in national legislation, but also leads to 
anti-competitive effects due to the manner these rules are implemented.  
 
From the perspective of the consumers in the importing country the use of anti-dumping 
measures are economically irrational due to the negative impact it can have on consumer 
welfare through the increase in prices in the domestic market. According to Voon (2009:6) 
the higher prices paid by consumers and its negative impact outweighs the benefit which the 
domestic industry receives through the specific protection. According to Alavi and Ahamat 
(2004:62) if dumping injures the domestic industry, then anti-dumping measures can be seen 
to harm the domestic consumers and intermediate users of the specific good. Anti-dumping 
measures can be detrimental to the interest of the consumers and intermediate users if these 
market participants have benefitted from the availability of cheap imports in the market as a 
result of dumping. Applying anti-dumping measures on these goods increase the prices in the 
domestic market and reduce consumer surplus. The intermediate users of the import product 
will also be affected adversely due to higher priced intermediate product that must be 
incorporated into further production processes. This decreases the competitiveness of firms 
due to an increase in the cost of production that can drive producers from the market in the 
long-run (Alavi & Ahamat, 2004:76-77).  
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If anti-dumping measures are utilised to protect inefficient domestic producers, the cost to the 
consumers and intermediate users will outweigh the benefit which will accrue to the domestic 
producers through the protection. Inefficiency is in itself damaging to domestic producers in 
that these firms are unable to compete in the global market without being protected. This 
means that anti-dumping measures can protect inefficient domestic industries which can not 
compete with foreign suppliers, potentially seeking to capture the domestic market by 
utilising the protectionism to become a monopolist in the market (Alavi & Ahamat, 2004:78). 
If there are no possible substitutes available in the market, whether domestically produced or 
imported, consumers and intermediate users will have no other available option than to 
purchase the imported goods at the higher price (Alavi & Ahamat, 2004:77). 
 
Gausch and Rajapatirana (1998:5) also state that anti-dumping measures can have a 
detrimental effect on exporters. Anti-dumping law can create two distinct incentives for the 
exporters of a specific product. The first is the distortion of the marketing decisions of the 
exporter. An exporter faced by the threat of anti-dumping measures can decide to limit its 
exports to the complainant market and increase its supply to its home market. In turn the 
price of the product in the exporting market will increase, while the increased supply of the 
product in the domestic market will lead to a decrease in the price of the product in the 
domestic market. The second incentive to the exporter will depend on the importance of the 
complainant market as an export destination to the exporting firm. If the complainant market 
is a significant market for the exporting firm, the firm can change its foreign direct 
investment decision by deciding to relocate its production processes to the particular 
importing market in order to avoid the implementation of an anti-dumping duty.   
 
It is suggested that the elimination of anti-dumping measures and the harmonisation of 
competition policy can enhance economic welfare. However, the ability of a regional trade 
arrangement to utilise competition policy will depend on the national and regional anti-
dumping rules, competition principles and institutions and the level of integration present in 
the regional configuration (Prusa and Teh, 2009:8).  
 
5.3 Are anti-dumping measures against the principles of a regional trade 
arrangement? 
Over the years there has been an ongoing debate whether the implementation of anti-dumping 
measures are suitable in the context of intra-regional trade in a customs union. This has been 
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a multi-dimensional debate, focussing on the different elements of the definition of a customs 
union in terms of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. Questions which have been relevant to 
the debate include: (i) are countries prohibited from implementing anti-dumping measures 
against intra-regional trading partners in a customs union under WTO law and (ii) are 
provisions which preclude custom union member countries from implementing anti-dumping 
measures against each other mandatory, permissible or prohibited by the WTO rules (Voon, 
2009:21)?  
 
According to Mathis (2000:47) anti-dumping measures seem to be inconsistent with the basic 
idea of a customs union as a single territory. When trading partners agree to become a 
customs union and to have a harmonised external trade policy and free intra-regional 
circulation of goods, by mere definition of a customs union the member states should also 
forego their legal ability to apply anti-dumping measures to the goods of other member 
countries. Once goods have entered the single territory there is no need to establish the origin 
of the goods, making it impractical for countries to implement trade policy measures on 
goods from countries a party to the customs union. If intra-regional anti-dumping measures 
were to be permitted then rules of origin are needed to determine which goods will be subject 
to these duties. However, this will result in a failure of free circulation of intra-regional goods 
which is the basic premise of a customs union. Mathis (2000:48) states that anti-dumping 
duties on internal trade must be prohibited as of the end of the transition period of a regional 
trade arrangement and replaced by regional competition policies as an alternative method to 
remedy dumping. 
 
Although there has been no definitive finding on these questions by the WTO dispute 
settlement body, Gobbi and Horlick (2006:911) take the view that there is a number of 
statements which the WTO Appellate Body made regarding Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 
1994 in the Turkey-Textile case which may shed some light on the ability of countries to 
utilise anti-dumping measures in a customs union. The Appellate Body decision provides 
some guidance on the issue of Article XXIV:8 of the GATT 1994 either mandating or simply 
allowing trade remedies to be eliminated from regional trade agreements.  
 
Figure 4 below shows a graphical representation of the arguments and questions surrounding 
the debate on the role anti-dumping measures should and could play in a customs union. 
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In answering the question of whether the retention of anti-dumping measures is against the 
basic premise of a customs union we have to focus on the two distinct exceptions to the WTO 
rule in the question: the first being a customs union in itself being and exception and the 
second being the use of anti-dumping measures to temporarily negate trade liberalisation. 
According to Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 countries can only benefit from the 
customs union exception if the level of internal trade liberalisation is such that any duties and 
other type of restrictions are eliminated with respect to substantially all the intra-regional 
trade. A customs union are thus only allowed to maintain a limited number of trade restriction 
as listed in the article, including certain measures to safeguard a country’s balance of 
payments, exchange arrangements and measures to protect animal, human and plant life 
(Gobbi & Horlick, 2006:910). The article seems to imply that all contingent protection 
measures, including anti-dumping measures should be eliminated from the internal trade of a 
customs union in order to fulfil the requirements set out in the article (Emerson, 2008:11-12). 
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Figure 4: Anti-dumping measures in regional trade agreements 
 
5.3.1 Customs union as an exception to the rule 
According to Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 a customs union is ‘the substitution of a 
single customs territory for two or more customs territories so that: (i) duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles 
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all 
trade in products originating in such territories….’ 
Anti-dumping measures allowable i.t.o WTO rule (Art. VI of the GATT 
1994 and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement) 
Anti-dumping duties allowable in a 
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GATT 1994) 
Not allowed: against 
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(2006) except if 
Allowable in terms 
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Irrespective of illustrative (Pauwelyn (2004); Voon 
(2008); Gobbi & Horlick (2006)) or exhaustive (Emerson 
(2008)) list approach it must be eliminated (Gobbi & 
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(Pauwelyn (2004)) 
No restrictions allowed on 
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dumping duties allowable 
(Gobbi & Horlick (2006)) 
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One of the basic principles of the WTO is the principle of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment. In terms of trade in goods this principle means that a WTO member country must 
extend any benefit it gives to the products of one country to the products of all WTO 
members. However, regional trade agreements are an exception to this basic principle where 
preferential treatment is granted to the products of the regional trade arrangement member 
countries, without having to extend the benefit to other WTO countries not a party to the 
regional arrangement (Voon, 2009:4). Regional trade agreements are allowable exceptions 
under the WTO rules, given their potential to facilitate the transition to greater multilateral 
liberalisation (Voon, 2009:27). Thus a customs unions as a regional trade agreement can be 
reconciled with the principles of the GATT 1994 as facilitating wider and deeper 
liberalisation in regional and multilateral trade (Marceau, 1994:).   
 
5.3.2 The WTO exception of anti-dumping measures 
In terms of trade remedies, anti-dumping measures in themselves violate the MFN rule. By 
implementing an anti-dumping measure a WTO member can levy a higher import duty on a 
specific product imported from another specific WTO member, discriminating against the 
imports of that specific trading partner which now receives less favourable treatment than the 
imports of that specific product from any other country due to a higher import duty being 
levied (Voon, 2009:5). Given the exception in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement allowing WTO member countries to utilise anti-dumping 
measures in specific circumstances, WTO member states are able to utilise a measure which 
would otherwise have been inconsistent with WTO rules.  
 
5.3.2.1 Anti-dumping measures as ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce’ listed in article XXIV:8(a) 
According to Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) any duties or other restrictive measures must be 
eliminated, except for those which are allowed in the exception list. The question on how to 
precisely interpret this part of the article has resulted in three points of contention: (a) are 
anti-dumping measures ‘duties or restrictive regulations of commerce’ as meant by the 
article; (b) should anti-dumping measures be read into the exclusion list of allowable 
restrictions; and (c) whether maintaining anti-dumping measures in a customs union are 
contrary to the requirements of ‘substantially all trade’. Although Article VI of the GATT 
1994 is not explicitly included into the list the argument has been made that the list is only 
illustrative and not exhaustive of the allowable measures in a customs union. So far no 
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consensus and definitive clarification of the interpretation of this section has been provided 
by either WTO member states or the WTO dispute settlement process (Gobbi & Horlick, 
2006:911). 
 
a) ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ 
According to Gobbi & Horlick (2006:914) anti-dumping measures cannot be interpreted to 
fall within the true definition and meaning of ‘duties’. According to the authors the English 
version of Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) of the GATT uses the term ‘duties’, while the Spanish and 
French versions utilises the term ‘customs duties’ in the same article. Thus according to the 
article, customs duties need to be eliminated in order to comply with the requirements for a 
customs union. While anti-dumping measures might be seen as an additional duty levied on 
the importation of a specific product, the authors state that it cannot be interpreted to have the 
meaning of a customs duty, defined as a tariff, in the true sense of the word.  
 
The other aspect which must be considered is whether anti-dumping measures can be seen as 
‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’ (ORRC) in terms of the GATT 1994. If anti-
dumping measures cannot be defined as ORRC then there is no obligation on the members of 
a customs union to eliminate these measures on intra-regional trade. (Voon, 2009:34).   
 
According to Gobbi and Horlick (2006:918) ORRC include regulations which have a 
restrictive impact on trade, including border measures and internal regulations which affect 
imports adversely when compared to the domestic products not subject to the same measures. 
This interpretation of ORRC includes anti-dumping duties which are levied on imports at the 
border and not applicable to domestically produced products. Thus and anti-dumping duty is 
an additional duty levied on an import product which can restrict the importation of the 
specific good, justifying the inclusion of anti-dumping measures in the meaning of ORRC. In 
terms of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 this means anti-dumping measures are part of 
those restriction which have to be eliminated to fulfil the internal trade liberalisation 
requirements of a customs union; depending on whether Article VI of the GATT 1994 falls in 
the ambit of the exclusion list applicable to Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) of the GATT 1994 (Gobbi 
& Horlick, 2006:919).  
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b) The exclusion list in Article XXIV: 8(a)(i) 
The debate regarding whether or not anti-dumping measures are included in the list of 
measures which are excluded from the internal trade liberalisation requirements is focused on 
the following argument: the list of measures which do not have to be liberalised regarding 
‘substantially’ all internal trade is only an illustrative list of these exceptions allowed in a 
customs union and not an exhaustive list of the only allowable exclusions. Pauwelyn 
(2004:126-127) states that the mere fact that Article VI of the GATT is not included in the 
exclusion list does not mean that it is not allowed in a customs union. The author’s argument 
that the exclusion list is mere illustrative is based on the fact that Article XV dealing with 
trade restrictions when a country is experiencing balance of payment difficulties are included 
in the list, while Article XVIIIB of the GATT 1994 dealing with allowable trade restrictions 
when specific developing countries have balance of payment difficulties are not included in 
the list. For the author this clearly indicates that the list was only meant to be illustrative as it 
will be irrational to include one provision dealing with restriction for balance of payment 
difficulties while excluding another.  
 
Voon (2009:34) follows the same type of argument by focussing on the purpose of anti-
dumping measures. The author states that anti-dumping measures have the legitimate purpose 
of protecting a domestic industry against unfair trade practices (dumping). However, Article 
VI of the GATT 1994 is not included in the exclusion list, while Article XX of the GATT 
1994 with the legitimate purpose of protecting human and animal health is included in the 
exclusion list and thus allowed in a customs union. According to the author it is illogical to 
allow one restriction for a legitimate purpose in a customs union, while another is excluded; 
except if the basic premise of the list is to only illustrate the types of restrictions which is 
allowed in a customs union (Voon, 2009:35). 
 
Gobbi and Horlick (2006:921) also classify the exclusion list as being illustrative, but focus 
their discussion on the possible ways to interpret the exclusion list. According to the authors, 
the exclusion list can possibly be interpreted in any of the following three ways. A WTO 
member country: 
i. must apply the excepted provisions to the regional trading partners and may eliminate 
trade remedies from the regional agreement; or  
ii. may apply the excepted provisions to regional members and must eliminate trade 
remedies; or  
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iii. the excepted provisions may be applied against trade partners and countries may 
eliminate trade remedy provisions.  
 
The authors state that the foundation for answering this question can be found in the ruling by 
the WTO Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case. In this case the Appellate Body found 
that ‘subparagraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 establishes the standard for the 
internal trade between constituent Members in order to satisfy the definition of a customs 
union. The article requires member countries of a customs union to eliminate ‘duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce’ with respect to ‘substantially all the trade’ between 
them. The Appellate Body went on the find that ‘the terms of the subparagraph 8(a)(i) 
provide that members of a customs union may maintain, where necessary, in their internal 
trade, certain restrictive regulations of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles 
XI through XV and under Article XX of the GATT 1994.’  
 
According to Gobbi and Horlick (2006:933) this paragraph endorses the ‘may’ interpretation 
pertaining to the exclusion list, thus member countries may apply the excepted provisions to 
their trading partners, but not mandated to do so. However, this still leaves two options on 
how to interpret the implementation of anti-dumping measures in a regional agreement: 
countries may apply the exclusions to trading partners and must eliminate trade remedies on 
intra-regional trade and countries may apply the exclusions and trade remedies to trading 
partners (Gobbi and Horlick, 2006: 933). The authors however, feel that the may-may 
approach will leave the exception list meaningless and inconsistent with the true intent of the 
article leaving the only possible explanation that Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 places 
an obligations on trading partners in a customs union to eliminate any other duties or 
restrictive regulations from the customs union, including the utilisation of anti-dumping 
measures (Gobbi and Horlick, 2006:935). 
 
Emerson (2008:12) however, is not convinced by the arguments of the other authors that the 
exclusion list is purely illustrative and holds the firm belief that the drafters of Article XXIV 
of the GATT 1994 intended the exclusion list to be an exhaustive list of duties and other 
restrictive regulations allowable in a customs union. The argument follows that the mere fact 
that the drafters did not include Article VI of the GATT 1994 in the exclusion list shows their 
intention that anti-dumping measures fall in the ambit of those measures which need to be 
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eliminated from a customs union to make the customs union an allowable exception to the 
basic principles of the WTO rule.  
 
Although there has been no definitive answer on whether the exclusion list is exhaustive or 
purely illustrative, following the interpretations of both Gobbi and Horlick (2006) and 
Emerson (2008) which have different views on the nature of the exclusion list, the conclusion 
remains the same: anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade need to be eliminated for a 
regional arrangement to comply with the requirements for a customs union. 
 
5.3.2.2 ‘substantially all trade’ 
The last contentious element of Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 is that of whether anti-
dumping measures can be retained in a customs union, given the requirement that restrictive 
regulations, other than those in the exclusion list, must be eliminated in terms of 
‘substantially all trade’ of the regional arrangement. 
 
Pauwelyn (2004:127) states that the requirement in Article XXIV:8(a) of the GATT 1994 is 
that duties and trade restrictions be eliminated on ‘substantially all trade’ and not the 
elimination of all trade restrictions except those seen as being necessary under the exception 
list included in the article. Neither under GATT 1994 nor the WTO has member countries 
come to a definitive conclusion regarding the meaning of ‘substantially all trade’ in this 
article. However, the author states that it is clear that ‘substantially all trade’ does not mean 
the same as a requirement to eliminate duties and trade restrictions on all the intra-regional 
trade. On the other hand, ‘substantially all trade’ can also be interpreted to mean considerably 
more than just some of the intra-regional trade of a customs union. However, subparagraph 
8(a)(i) of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 allows for some flexibility in the liberalisation of 
the internal trade of a customs union by allowing the trade restrictions in the exclusion list. 
This leads Pauwelyn (2004:127) to conclude that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 allows 
countries some flexibility when liberalising intra-customs union trade, which is a degree of 
flexibility possibly wide enough to allow for the implementation of anti-dumping measures 
on intra-regional trade.     
 
Gobbi and Horlick (2006:937) follow a very strict approach to the elimination of duties and 
restrictive regulations on intra-regional trade. According to the authors all duties and 
restrictive regulations must be eliminated from substantially all the intra-regional trade, 
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meaning the complete removal or expulsion of those duties and restrictive regulations not in 
the exclusion list. Duties and restrictive regulations must be completely eliminated from that 
part of the internal trade of the customs union which is covered by the trade liberalisation 
program in the customs union. This means that no trade restrictions can be in place on any 
part of the intra-regional trade that is intended to satisfy the ‘substantially all trade’ threshold 
(Gobbi & Horlick, 2006:938).  
 
Compiling all the arguments above leads to the following conclusion: anti-dumping measures 
are allowable trade measures in terms of WTO law and cannot be interpreted as ‘duties’ that 
must be eliminated in a customs union in terms of Article XXIV: 8(a) of the GATT 1994. 
However, anti-dumping measures can be interpreted as falling outside the exclusion list of 
allowable restrictive regulations in a customs union and need to be eliminated with respect to 
‘substantially all the trade’ among trading partners. ‘Substantially all the trade’ provides the 
only flexibility for possibly allowing anti-dumping measures in a customs union, however 
according to Mathis (2000:48) even an anti-dumping duty on goods falling outside the ambit 
of ‘substantially all the trade’ is still against the basic premise of a customs union. 
 
5.4 Regional trade arrangements in which anti-dumping measures have been 
abolished 
Although many regional and bilateral trade agreements have been concluded over the years, 
the elimination of anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade combined with the 
harmonisation or coordination of competition policies among member countries have in 
general not played a major role in bilateral and regional trade negotiations. The abolition of 
anti-dumping measures among countries is difficult to achieve. In those regional trade 
agreements which have eliminated anti-dumping measures from intra-regional trade, the 
European Commission, European Economic Area, Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement and the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the process 
included a measured approach from the liberalisation of goods, services and factors of 
production to the coordination and in some cases the harmonisation of competition policies 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:13).  
 
Competition provisions included in regional trade agreements generally fall into two 
categories, these provisions are either NAFTA-type or EU-type provisions. NAFTA-type 
provisions are characterised by the fact that there are no substantive rules included in the 
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provisions on competition issues. The application of the relevant competition policy is the 
responsibility of the national competition authority of each member state according to the 
applicable domestic legislation in a trading partner. This requires each member country to 
have domestic competition policy in place and a mechanism for coordination among the 
individual competition authorities in the member states. The EU-type provisions create supra-
national competition laws with an enforcement mechanism which is applicable to all member 
countries (Matsushita, 2010:19). 
 
Although limited, the number of regional trade agreements in which anti-dumping measures 
where successfully eliminated and competition policies coordinated or harmonised can 
provide valuable information on the conditions needed to remove anti-dumping measures 
from intra-regional trade (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:8). 
 
5.4.1 European Community (EC)   
Hoekman (1998:14) sees the EC as a unique regional arrangement in that it requires the 
complete liberalisation of trade in goods, services, labour and capital. The regional 
arrangement is also distinct in the extent and reach of constraints placed on member countries 
in terms of the regulatory policies which can have an impact on intra-regional trade. Common 
principles related to subsidies, monopolies, government procurement and competition are 
imposed on all members. These disciplines are also enforced by supranational and national 
bodies, including the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. One of the 
consequences of liberalising the markets and adopting common competition policies among 
all member states is the explicit prohibition of anti-dumping measures in the common market 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:9).  
 
The Treaty of Rome (Article 85 and 86) prohibits the use of competition restrictive or 
distortive practices and the abuse of a dominant position in terms of intra-European trade. 
Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits agreements and practices which will restrict or distort intra-
regional competition and affect intra-EC trade negatively (Hoekman, 2002:4). Article 86 
states that the abuse of a dominant position is prohibited, with dominance being determined 
on the basis of the relevant product and geographical area. The article also contains an 
illustrative list of possible abuses, including unfair trading, price discrimination and 
restricting output or the access to markets. The Treaty explicitly states that the use of 
contingent protection measures, including anti-dumping measures have no place in the 
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common market. Article 91 of the Treaty allowed for the implementation of anti-dumping 
measures only during the 12 year transition period to the full implementation of the Treaty 
which have already expired (Hoekman, 2002:6).  
 
However, this does not mean that member countries cannot take action against dumping, but 
rather that they cannot implement anti-dumping measures. Anti-dumping measures are 
allowable only in the case of dumping by a third party country. The EC supranational 
competition rules and authority applies to both private firms and the government (Hoekman 
& Mavroidis, 1994:13). Although competition policies are used the address unfair trade 
practices in the EC, the Treaty do not establish a link between the use of competition policies 
as a substitute for anti-dumping measures. Instead the argument seems to follow that once all 
trade barriers were removed among member countries there was no justification for 
maintaining anti-dumping measures. Competition provisions are seen as necessary in the 
creation of an integrated market in Europe (Hoekman, 2002:6).  
 
To initiate an action against alleged intra-regional dumping a member state must file a 
petition under the Community’s competition policy to the competition authority under the 
Directorate-General for Competition. If a violation is found the offending firm will be 
ordered to take action to correct the injury caused by the abuse of the dominant position 
subject to a fine (Nordstrom, 2009: 7). 
 
Although there seems to be a division in addressing intra-regional dumping  versus dumping 
by a third party country, competition policy can actually be used on both occasions. 
However, anti-dumping measures are only available to take action against dumping by third 
party countries. The EC Treaty is ‘blind to nationality’ in the application of their competition 
policy. Thus the EC competition policy can be applied to unfair trade practices irrespective of 
the geographical location of the registered office, headquarters or shareholders of the firm. 
Firms of third party countries can be held accountable for injury caused by dumping in the 
EC under the competition policy of the EC. However, the member countries still prefer to 
implement anti-dumping measures against importers from non-member countries. This is 
mainly due to the legal standard in anti-dumping proceedings being lower than that of 
competition proceedings in the EC (Nordstrom, 2009:8).  
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5.4.2 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) 
ANZCERTA is a free trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand which was 
established in 1983. In 1983 the two countries had vast differing competition policies with 
those of Australia based on the United States model, while the competition principles of New 
Zealand more in line with the approach in the United Kingdom. New Zealand enacted new 
competition legislation in 1986 which was consistent with that of the Australian competition 
system. This facilitated the discussions between governments to eliminate bilateral anti-
dumping measures (Hoekman, 1998:24-25). According to Marceau (1994:209) ANZCERTA 
is quite interesting because it is so far the only free trade arrangements which have been 
successful in the elimination of anti-dumping measures without the adoption of supranational 
legislation or authority regarding competition policy to control restrictive business practices 
which may arise in the bilateral arrangement. The countries followed a two-step procedure to 
fully eliminate anti-dumping measures between them. The first was the recognition that full 
trade liberalisation is not sufficient to eliminate the incentives for firms to dump and 
governments to implement anti-dumping measures. The second step was to provide further 
motivation for the elimination of anti-dumping measures through the development and 
enforcement of agreed competition laws between the countries (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 
1994:11). 
 
The Preamble of the Protocol in Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods (1988) describes the 
use of anti-dumping measures between the two countries as being ‘inappropriate’ in the strive 
for full trade liberalisation in the trade of goods between them. Article 4 of the free trade area 
slightly modifies the Preamble and states ‘the member states agree that anti-dumping 
measures in respect of goods originating in the territory of the other member states are not 
appropriate from time of achievement of both free trade in goods between the member states 
on 1 July 1990, and the application of their competition laws to relevant anti-competitive 
conduct affecting trans-Tasman trade in goods.’ The article also obliges the countries to take 
the necessary steps to ensure that their competition policies are consistent with the principles 
and objectives of the free trade area (Hoekman, 2002:9). The competition authorities also 
concluded a bilateral Cooperation and Coordination Agreement in 1994 to remove any 
inconsistencies in apply the law (Hoekman, 1998:26). 
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Australia and New Zealand agreed to enforce similar competition laws with the jurisdiction 
of the respective national competition authorities extended to matters related to Australia-
New Zealand trade, allowing for the extra-territorial application of national competition 
policy. In terms of the countries’ competition policies nationals of one country can be made 
the subject of an investigation by the authority of the other state, including market power in 
either one of the national markets or the combined Australia-New Zealand market. Courts can 
also sit in the other country, orders can be served in the other country and court judgements 
are enforceable in both countries (Hoekman, 1998:25). This means that a dominant firm in 
New Zealand, selling at price below cost in Australia can contravene the law in Australia, 
even if the firm did not have market power in the Australian market, if the business practice 
affected the market of Australia (Marceau, 1994:213).  
 
5.4.3 The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) 
The EEA was negotiated by the European Free Trade Association states (excluding 
Switzerland) and the EU in 1992 (Hoekman, 1998:20). The agreement brings together the 27 
member countries of the EC with three EFTA states, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, in a 
single market known as the Internal Market (Hoekman, 2002:6) and was build from the free 
trade arrangement negotiated between these regional configurations in the 1970’s (Hoekman, 
1998:20). During the bilateral negotiations the EFTA-states agreed to adopt the majority of 
the EC’s policies, including the competition policies of the EC and a wide range of EC 
legislation (Hoekman, 2002:6).  
 
Article 26 of the EEA eliminates the use of anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties 
on trade between the contracting parties (Hoekman, 1998:20). According to Article 26 of the 
EEA the use of anti-dumping measures against illicit commercial practices shall not be 
applied among the contracting parties, unless it is otherwise specified in the agreement 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:10). The only exception to the non-implementation of anti-
dumping measures among member countries is trade of farm and fish product.  
 
The elimination of anti-dumping measures was encouraged under the auspice of the desire of 
the EEA and its member countries to encourage good forms of competitions while 
discouraging bad forms (Nordstrom, 2009: 9). EEA countries have also adopted and 
implemented common competition rules, which are the EC competition rules, to counteract 
the elimination of anti-dumping measures among member countries which applies to all 
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private firms and the government (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:10). Supranational bodies, 
the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Body, are responsible for the 
enforcement of the EEA competition principles. The latter has jurisdiction if at least one third 
of the turnover of a firm which is subject to an anti-competitive complaint is in an EFTA 
state (Hoekman, 1998:21). 
 
In the true sense the EFTA states did not adopt the common policies of the EC, the EC rather 
extended full free trade in goods, services and factors of production to the EFTA countries 
(Hoekman, 2002:6).  
 
5.4.4 Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) 
The free trade agreement between Canada and Chile was signed in December 1996 and 
entered into force on 5 July 1997 (Holmes et al, 2005:82). According to Holmes et al 
(2005:83) the CCFTA has two main features of trade liberalisation. The first was the 
immediate duty-free entry of 85 percent of Canada’s exports into Chile and the second was 
the elimination of Chile’s 11 percent import duties on all other goods over a period of five 
years. Both parties also committed to further trade liberalisation focused on the elimination of 
various non-tariff barriers, including qualitative restrictions, licensing requirements and other 
non-discriminatory measures.  
 
The CCFTA also includes basic provisions on competition policy and cooperation with 
general provisions on notification, consultation and the exchange of information. In 2001 the 
parties signed a detailed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on competition issues, 
including provisions on cooperation and coordination, the avoidance of conflicts procedures 
and regular meetings among competition officials (Holmes et al, 2005:83). 
 
The CCFTA also provides for the elimination of anti-dumping investigations and duties 
between the parties by January 2003. Articles M-01, M-02 and M-03 of the CCFTA states 
that member countries will not initiate any new anti-dumping investigation and reviews or 
apply any new anti-dumping measure after January 2003 and also calls for all existing 
investigations, reviews and measures to be discontinued as from the beginning of 2003 
(Holmes et al, 2005:84). 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
66 
 
The CCFTA has been able to eliminate the use of anti-dumping measures between the partner 
countries without the harmonisation of competition policies and the creation of a supra-
national competition body. The CCFTA only requires the parties to have a designated contact 
point which can facilitate communication between the parties in the matters related to the 
CCFTA, including competition issues (Holmes et al, 2005:85)  
 
5.4.5 Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 
MERCOSUR was established in 1991 as a common market with a common external tariff 
among four South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The 
common external tariff was implemented in 1995 (Hoekman, 1998:29). Although 
MERCOSUR is referred to as a customs union, Florencio (2007:7) states that it is actually an 
imperfect customs union and can be classified as in an intermediate position between a free 
trade arrangement and a customs union. This is mostly due to some existing exception to the 
common external tariff: imported goods are still charged the common external tariff each 
time the goods cross the border into another member country. Anti-dumping duties can also 
still be applied on intra-regional trade (Florencio, 2007:8). It seems that the MERCOSUR 
countries are following an approach similar to Australia and New Zealand in ANZCERTA, 
not creating common competition policies, but rather ensuring that competition policies 
among members are similar. So far there is no explicit commitment or requirement for 
countries to eliminate intra-regional anti-dumping measures, but it is on the agenda 
(Hoekman, 2002:11). Member countries have initiated a process to harmonise their various 
national competition policies and create a mechanism to coordinate actions against anti-
competitive practices (Hoekman, 1998:30).    
 
MERCOSUR differs in its approach to decision-making in comparison with decision making 
in the EC. There is no supranational decision-making body in MERCOSUR with the decision 
making process taking place on consensus among member states. According to Article 4 of 
the Treaty of Asunción one of the main objectives of MERCOSUR is to coordinate the 
national policies of each member state to ensure the establishment of common legislation on 
trade and competition issues. In order to attain this goal a working group was selected to 
establish common legislation on competition policy. The proposal made by the working 
group was concluded and officially approved in 1996. However, only Brazil and Paraguay 
have incorporated the common legislation into their domestic laws (Florencio, 2007:11).  
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According to the MERCOSUR Treaty anti-dumping measures on internal trade remains in 
force, with the intention of eliminating these measures once the Common Rules on the 
Defence of Internal Competition is implemented. In December 1996 a Protocol for the 
Defence of Competition within MERCOSUR was adopted. This Protocol states that actions 
by member countries which distort or restrict intra-regional competition and trade are 
prohibited. The implementation of these intra-regional rules remains the responsibility of the 
various national competition authorities, although the enforcement of the rules is in the hands 
of the MERCOSUR institutions. In 2000 the MERCOSUR Commerce Commission was 
given the task to establish a phase-out program for the complete elimination of anti-dumping 
measures. However, currently the progress on the abolition of anti-dumping duties in 
MERCOSUR is unclear (Florencio, 2007:13).  
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6. SACU as a regional trade agreement 
SACU is the oldest customs union, dating back to 1889 when the Customs Union Convention 
was brought into being between the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange 
Free State. The first agreement which also incorporated Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (BLNS) was signed in 1910. The 1910 SACU Agreement was in effect until 1969 
with the purpose of establishing a common external tariff (CET), free movement of goods 
within the customs territory and a revenue-sharing formula for the distribution of customs 
revenues among member states. The 1969 SACU Agreement made two fundamental changes 
to the 1910 Agreement: excise duties were included into the revenue pool and a multiplier 
was included into the revenue-sharing formula to increase the revenues of the BLNS 
countries. No provision was made for a joint-decision making process in the customs union; 
South Africa had the sole decision-making power over customs policies (History of SACU, 
2007). 
 
Negotiations to craft a new SACU Agreement commenced in 1994. This led to the 2002 
SACU Agreement which is currently in force. The Heads of State of the member countries 
signed the 2002 SACU Agreement on 21 October 2002 and it entered into force in 2004 
(Mathis, 2005:4). The agreement consists of a Preamble, nine parts and one Annex. This 
Agreement allows for a joint-decision making process, various SACU institutional bodies, a 
new revenue-sharing formula and a common negotiating mechanism for negotiating trade 
agreement with third party countries.  
 
The Preamble of the 2002 Agreement recognises its predecessor as being no longer effective 
to cater for the different needs of the member states, especially in light of the absence of 
common policies and institutions in the 1969 Agreement and the different levels of 
development of the various member states.  
 
The 2002 Agreement allows for the creation of various SACU institutions. The Council of 
Ministers are the body responsible for the legislative function in the customs union. The 
Council is responsible for the overall policy direction of SACU and the functioning of all 
SACU institutions. This includes the formulation of policies, mandates, procedures and 
guidelines and ensuring the implementation of SACU policies. The executive function of 
SACU is the responsibility of the Customs Union Commission. The Commission is 
responsible for implementing the decisions made by the Council and the provisions of the 
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SACU Treaty, including the mandate for implementing certain common policies (Mathis, 
2005:6). The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the customs 
union. Five Technical Liaison Committees have also been created by the agreement with the 
aim of assisting and advising the Commission in various areas important to the Common 
Customs Area. These areas include agriculture, customs, trade and industry, transport and 
finance. The Liaison Committee on Trade and Industry will have various duties, including 
assisting the Commission in the development and implementation of common policies and 
the development of those policies and instruments needed for cooperation in the area of 
competition policy. The Tariff Board is also yet to be established, but once established will 
consist of experts from the different member countries. The responsibilities of the Tariff 
Board will include making recommendations to the Council regarding the implementation of 
anti-dumping measures to imports for outside the Common Customs Area. The agreement 
also provides for the creation of a Tribunal, composed of three members. The tasks of the 
Tribunal will include the adjudication of issues arising from the interpretation and 
implementation of the 2002 SACU Agreement (SACU, 2007).  
 
Figure 5 below shows the progression of the provision of the different SACU Agreements 
from 1910 to 2002. 
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Figure 5: Development of the provisions of the SACU Agreement 
 
Source: SACU (2012) 
 
The 2002 Agreement also focuses on deeper regional integration and the enhancement of 
cooperation among member states. The SACU Treaty contains a section pertaining to 
common policies in the customs union. These are applicable in the areas of industrial 
development (Article 38), agriculture policy (Article 39), competition policy (Article 40) and 
unfair trade practices (Article 41). However, Mathis (2005:8) states that the interpretation of 
common policies in the context of SACU does not necessarily entail the creation of common 
policies in the true sense of the word. Article 41 regarding unfair trade practices does not 
refer to common policies within the article, but rather places an obligation on the SACU 
institutions to develop policies and instruments needed to address unfair trade practise among 
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the member states. Article 40 regarding competition policies also does not refer to common 
policies to be created among member countries. The article instead states that the individual 
member countries must have national competition policies and calls for the cooperation 
among members to ensure the effective implementation of these domestic competition rules. 
 
6.1 Sector-specific analysis of anti-dumping measures and SACU intra-regional 
trade 
South Africa is the only country in SACU which is an active user of anti-dumping measures 
and have been affected by the implementation of anti-dumping duties by other countries. The 
other member states have hardly ever been the subject of an anti-dumping investigation or 
used anti-dumping measures on intra- or extra-regional trade. Most African countries, 
including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland are excluded for the application of 
multilateral anti-dumping measures due to the Special and Differential Treatment provisions 
for developing and least developed countries provided for in the GATT 1994 and the WTO 
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Another possible reason why the rest of SACU have not been 
affected by the implementation of anti-dumping measures by third party countries is due to 
the nature of the products these countries export to the rest of the world. SACU countries 
have also not been targeted by anti-dumping measures implemented by other member states. 
This can be explained by the following argument. South Africa is the only SACU country 
which has implemented anti-dumping measures. However, South African legislation only 
allows for the use of anti-dumping measures on imports from third party countries into the 
SACU domestic industry. There is a caveat in the legislation regarding anti-dumping 
measures implemented by South Africa on intra-SACU trade. Even if legislation did 
somehow allow for intra-regional anti-dumping measures, the percentage of exports from the 
rest of SACU to South Africa is too small to warrant action to protect the domestic industry.   
 
On the import side the lack of use of anti-dumping measures by SACU countries (excluding 
South Africa) can be for various reasons. Regarding intra- and extra-regional trade, there is 
the lack of national legislation in all SACU countries (except South Africa) which enable the 
countries to implement anti-dumping measures. In terms of intra-SACU trade the question 
arise whether anti-dumping measures can be implemented on trade in a customs union. If we 
assume that anti-dumping measures are possible on intra-SACU trade and member countries 
have the required legislation the last factor which plays an important role is the aspect the 
sector-specific analysis will focus on. This is the sectoral composition of SACU imports and 
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the question whether the products the member states import are mostly those not susceptible 
to anti-dumping measures.  
 
6.1.1 Methodology 
The sector-specific analysis aims to establish whether there is a need for anti-dumping 
measures (or similar protection) on intra-SACU trade based on a comparison between intra-
regional import data for all member countries and those product sectors mostly affected by 
anti-dumping measures. The comparison is based on data obtained from two distinct sources. 
The intra-regional import data was sourced at the two digit level of the Harmonised System 
Codes of Commodity Classification (HS2) from the ITC TradeMap database which is based 
on UN COMTRADE Statistics, while data on the sector specific anti-dumping measures were 
sourced from the WTO statistical database. The data on anti-dumping measures include data 
from 2002 to 2011, while the trade data differs from country to country due to the availability 
of reported data: 
 Data on Botswana and South Africa is for the years 2002 to 2011; 
 The data for Lesotho and Swaziland include data from 2002 to 2007; and 
 Namibian import data is from 2002 to 2008.   
 
After the trade data was sourced at the HS2 level the data was aggregated into product sector 
classifications (Addendum A) in accordance with the data on anti-dumping measures which 
was sourced at the product sector level. The HS2 level trade data was aggregated according to 
the following concordance table: 
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Table 3: HS2 and product sector concordance table 
HS2 Chapters Concordant Product Sector Product Sector Description 
Ch 01 - 05 C01  Live animals, animal products  
Ch 06 - 14 C02  Vegetable products  
Ch 15 C03  Animal or vegetable fats & oils 
Ch 16 - 24 C04  Food, beverages & tobacco 
Ch 25 - 27 C05  Mineral products  
Ch 28 - 38 C06 Chemical products 
Ch 39 - 40 C07 Plastic products 
Ch 41 - 43 C08 Raw hides 
Ch 44 - 46 C09 Wood products 
Ch 47 - 49 C10 Paper products 
Ch 50 - 63 C11  Textiles & clothing 
Ch 64 - 67 C12  Footwear 
Ch 68 - 70 C13 Non-metallic minerals 
Ch 71 C14 Precious stones and metals 
Ch 72 - 83 C15 Base metals 
Ch 84 - 85 C16 Machinery 
Ch 86 - 89 C17 Transport equipment 
Ch 90 - 92 C18 Specialised equipment 
Ch 93 C19  Arms & ammunition 
Ch 94 - 96 C20  Misc manufactured articles  
Ch 97 C21 Collectors' pieces & antiques  
Ch 98 - 99 C22  Other unclassified goods  
  C23  Spec class/parts for motor vehicles 
Source: WTO (2012) 
 
This allowed for the comparison between intra-SACU import data and data on anti-dumping 
measures, both at the aggregated sectoral level.  
 
6.1.2 Sectoral anti-dumping analysis 
The data shows that chemical products (25 percent), base metals (22 percent), plastic 
products (15 percent), textiles and clothing (10 percent) and machinery (8 percent) are the 
product sectors which have mostly been affected by anti-dumping measures between 2002 
and 2011. The product sectors least affected by anti-dumping duties over the time period are 
raw hides (0.06 percent), animal or vegetable fats and oils (0.13 percent), footwear (0.47 
percent), transport equipment (1 percent) and live animals, animal products (1 percent). 
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Figure 6: Anti-dumping measures by product sector 
 
Source: WTO statistical database on anti-dumping measures (2012) 
 
The data also indicates that the products sectors in developing countries mostly affected by 
anti-dumping measures are base metals (15 percent), chemical products (11 percent), plastic 
products (8 percent), textiles and clothing (7 percent) and machinery (6 percent), while 
developing countries have mainly applied anti-dumping duties on chemical products (16 
percent), base metals (14 percent), plastic products (10 percent), textiles and clothing (7 
percent) and machinery (6 percent). Developed countries have mainly been affected by anti-
dumping measures on base metals (13 percent), chemical products (10 percent), plastic 
products (5 percent), machinery (3 percent) and paper products (2 percent), while the 
majority of measures implemented by developed countries have been on base metals (14 
percent), chemical products (5 percent), plastic products (2 percent), machinery (2 percent) 
and textiles and clothing (2 percent). 
 
6.1.3 Intra-regional trade data analysis 
The table below shows the results of the intra-regional import data analysis. The data is 
aggregated to show each product sector as a percentage of total intra-SACU imports over the 
given time period. 
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Table 4: Intra-SACU import data 
    Botswana Lesotho Namibia 
South 
Africa Swaziland 
    Imports from the rest of SACU 
Sector Sector Description 
2002-
2011 
2002-
2007 
2002-
2008 2002-2011 
2002-
2007 
C01 Live animals, animal products 2% 0% 3% 0% 4% 
C02 Vegetable products 5% 1% 3% 0% 7% 
C03 Animal or vegetable fats & oils 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
C04 Food, beverages & tobacco 8% 2% 10% 0% 7% 
C05 Mineral products 20% 19% 9% 0% 14% 
C06 Chemical products 8% 0% 10% 0% 19% 
C07 Plastic products 4% 0% 4% 0% 4% 
C08 Raw hides 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
C09 Wood products 1% 2% 1% 0% 1% 
C10 Paper products 3% 0% 4% 0% 4% 
C11 Textiles & clothing 4% 57% 5% 0% 5% 
C12 Footwear 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
C13 Non-metallic minerals 2% 0% 2% 0% 1% 
C14 Precious stones and metals 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
C15 Base metals 9% 0% 9% 0% 7% 
C16 Machinery 16% 1% 18% 0% 14% 
C17 Transport equipment 12% 1% 15% 0% 7% 
C18 Specialised equipment 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
C20 Misc manufactured articles 2% 17% 2% 0% 2% 
C21 Collectors' pieces & antiques 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
C22 Other unclassified goods 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: ITC TradeMap based on UN COMTRADE (2012) 
 
The results indicate the following trade patterns in intra-SACU imports over the last years: 
 Between 2002 and 2011 Botswana mainly imported mineral products, machinery and 
transport equipment from the other SACU member states, with South Africa being 
Botswana’s main trading partner during the time period. 
 Lesotho’s major product sectors, imported mainly from Swaziland, were textiles and 
clothing, mineral products and miscellaneous manufactured articles between 2002 and 
2007. 
 Namibia mainly imported machinery, transport equipment and food, beverages and 
tobacco products from South Africa from 2002 to 2008. 
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 Between 2002 and 2011 South Africa mainly imported precious stones and metals 
from Botswana. 
 Swaziland’s main intra-SACU trading partner, between 2002 and 2007, was South 
Africa. Over the time period Swaziland imported chemical products, mineral products 
and machinery. 
 
6.1.4 Comparing the sectoral analysis with import data 
Comparing intra-SACU imports with the product sectors in which anti-dumping measures 
have been implemented can provide a possible explanation for the lack of intra-regional anti-
dumping measures purely due to the nature of the main intra-regional import products of the 
member countries. This can also provide an explanation for the lack of anti-dumping 
legislation in the member states, especially legislation governing intra-regional anti-dumping 
measures. The table shows that the main intra-SACU import products from 2002 to 2011 
were machinery, mineral products and transport equipment, while anti-dumping duties were 
mainly levied on chemical products, base metals and plastic products during the same time 
period. 
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Table 5: Comparing anti-dumping measures and intra-SACU import data 
      Botswana Lesotho Namibia 
South 
Africa Swaziland 
    
Anti-
dumping 
measures Import from the rest of SACU (US$ millions) 
Section Description 
2002-
2011 
2002-
2011 
2002-
2007 
2002-
2008 
2002-
2011 
2002-
2007 
C01 
Live animals, animal 
products 1% 716.56 0.00 436.42 2.05 268.60 
C02 Vegetable products 1% 1,649.12 0.42 496.92 0.05 474.83 
C03 
Animal or vegetable 
fats & oils 0% 334.16 0.00 129.83 0.11 76.18 
C04 
Food, beverages & 
tobacco 1% 2,724.76 1.02 1,504.27 0.19 514.09 
C05 Mineral products 2% 6,756.27 8.62 1,295.22 0.00 986.26 
C06 Chemical products 25% 2,805.50 0.00 1,444.07 1.57 1,344.53 
C07 Plastic products 15% 1,455.32 0.13 642.67 0.02 300.90 
C08 Raw hides  0% 58.41 0.00 51.89 0.47 11.29 
C09 Wood products 2% 494.75 0.73 194.71 0.02 82.06 
C10 Paper products 4% 1,126.58 0.21 531.30 0.01 250.57 
C11 Textiles & clothing 11% 1,221.65 25.98 779.24 0.27 384.43 
C12 Footwear 0% 398.84 0.01 215.26 0.19 74.25 
C13 
Non-metallic 
minerals 4% 584.95 0.00 336.38 0.15 84.91 
C14 
Precious stones and 
metals 0% 89.11 0.00 43.70 2,022.67 4.94 
C15 Base metals 22% 2,928.90 0.17 1,294.12 0.21 487.09 
C16 Machinery 8% 5,456.07 0.32 2,690.90 1.49 971.00 
C17 
Transport 
equipment 1% 3,945.28 0.31 2,298.99 0.32 505.40 
C18 
Specialised 
equipment 1% 400.73 0.00 223.05 0.27 56.75 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0% 9.58 0.00 17.36 0.02 1.41 
C20 
Misc manufactured 
articles 2% 851.90 7.78 374.31 0.06 116.55 
C21 
Collectors' pieces & 
antiques 0% 2.43 0.00 3.20 0.03 0.52 
C22 
Other unclassified 
goods 0% 182.91 0.12 22.12 0.03 23.20 
Source: ITC TradeMap based on UN COMTRADE (2012); WTO statistical database on anti-
dumping measures (2012) 
 
The only product sector in which there is an overlap between a major import sector and anti-
dumping measures is chemical products in the case of Swaziland. Chemical products are the 
main import product for Swaziland and also the product sector which attracted the most anti-
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dumping duties between 2002 and 2011. South Africa is also the main source of chemical 
imports into Swaziland, accounting for 82 percent of Swaziland’s total chemical product 
imports in 2007. However, Swaziland is also an exporter of chemical products to South 
Africa. In 2007 99 percent of all chemical products exported by Swaziland were to South 
Africa. Analysing the import data between Swaziland and South Africa in more detail shows 
that the major chemical product imported by Swaziland from South Africa forms a small 
percentage of the total Swaziland-South Africa import products. At the HS6 level the most 
important chemical products Swaziland imported from South Africa between 2002 and 2007 
were mixtures of odoriferous substances for food or drink (HS 330210) and citric acid (HS 
291814). However, these products only accounted for 10 percent of Swaziland’s total imports 
from South Africa over the time period (ITC TradeMap, 2012). The number of HS codes 
covered under the category of chemical products; instead of the value of imports can be the 
reason for chemical products being Swaziland’s main import product from 2002 to 2007.  
 
According to the data, the nature of intra-SACU imports can explain why there is a lack of 
intra-regional anti-dumping legislation and urgency to create the required legislation and 
implement intra-regional measures. According to the data analysis the main intra-SACU 
import products are those not greatly affected by multilateral anti-dumping measures. The 
only exception is in the case of chemical product imports by Swaziland, mainly from South 
Africa. This might be a concern for Swaziland which will require them to establish a 
mechanism to address possibly dumping in this product sector.       
      
6.2 Regional anti-dumping and competition policies and institutions in SACU 
Competition policy and unfair trade practices are included in part 8 of the 2002 SACU 
Agreement. This is the section of the agreement pertaining to the common policies in the 
Common Customs Area. The SACU Treaty does not allow for the creation and 
implementation of common competition policies, but rather calls for the cooperation among 
the governments of member states for the effective implementation of the national 
competition policies of the individual countries (Mathis, 2005:1). Figure 2 below shows the 
various provisions of the 2002 SACU Agreement applicable to intra- and extra-regional anti-
dumping measures and intra-regional competition policy cooperation. 
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Figure 7: Regional anti-dumping and competition policy 
 
Source: 2002 SACU Agreement 
 
Mathis (2005:4) identifies those SACU objectives pertaining to the cooperation among 
countries in the area of competition policies and the treatment of unfair trade practices to be 
the following: 
 Facilitating the intra-regional movement of goods; 
 Creating SACU institutions which will ensure an equitable distribution of trade 
benefits among members; 
 Promoting the conditions of fair competition; 
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 Enhancing investment opportunities; 
 Improving economic development, diversification, industrialisation and 
competitiveness of the individual member countries; 
 Integrating members into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment; 
and 
 Developing common policies and strategies.  
 
6.2.1 Anti-dumping policy 
Anti-dumping measures in the SACU Agreement falls under Article 41 of the agreement 
pertaining to unfair trade practices in the Common Customs Area. The article only states that 
the Council need to develop the required policies and instrument to address unfair trade 
practices between members. These policies and instruments will then be annexed to the 
agreement. However, this annex is yet to be completed.  
 
Article 41 only refers to unfair trade practices among member states. However, the article 
does not provide either a definition or explanation of the meaning of unfair trade practices in 
context of the Agreement nor makes reference to addressing unfair trade practices by third 
party countries.  
 
The implementation of trade remedies is included in the Agreement under Annex C Article 8 
which supplements Article 11 of the Agreement regarding the Tariff Board. However, both 
these articles are only applicable in the case of trade remedies applied on goods imported 
from outside the Common Customs Area. According to Article 11 the Tariff Board must 
make recommendations to the Council on anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard duties 
to be implemented on goods imported from third party countries. This shows that the Tariff 
Board has no authority when it comes to anti-dumping duties on intra-regional trade. Annex  
C Article 8 also seems to strengthen this approach. 
 
Article 8 of Annex C is applicable to the considerations which the national investigating 
authorities of each individual member country and the Tariff Board must take into account 
prior to implementing anti-dumping measures on goods being imported into the Common 
Customs Area. According to Annex C Article 8 each member state must have its own 
domestic investigating authority to make recommendations on anti-dumping measures to the 
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Tariff Board. The Tariff Board will then make further recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers which is taxed with making the final decision on the implementation of an anti-
dumping duty. The national investigating authorities must ensure that the implementation of 
anti-dumping measures is considered in accordance with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and 
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. After a complaint has been launched the national body 
has the authority to decide whether there will be an investigation into the alleged dumping. If 
the national authority does decide to investigate the allegation, the Secretariat must be 
informed of the allegation and the decision to investigate the matter (SACU Agreement, 
2002). 
 
Evaluating the provisions on anti-dumping measures and unfair trade practices in the 2002 
SACU Agreement, leads to the conclusion that there is currently a gap in the SACU 
provisions when it comes to the intra-regional implementation of anti-dumping measures, 
countervailing duties and safeguards. The Tariff Board and procedures in Annex C Article 8 
are only applicable to trade remedies on extra-regional imports, leaving intra-regional unfair 
trade practices to be governed by Article 41 of the 2002 SACU Agreement and an Annex 
which is not yet in existence.    
 
6.2.2 Competition policy 
Article 40 of the agreement has a very basic approach to competition policy in the customs 
union. According to the article member countries agreed that each member state shall have 
competition policies in place. The article also places an obligation on the member countries 
to cooperate with each other in terms of the enforcement of the domestic competition laws in 
each individual member state. The Agreement does not explicitly call for the development of 
a common competition policy to regulate competition within the whole SACU region, but 
rather that each member state must enforce domestic competition laws and cooperate with 
one another to ensure the efficient implementation of these laws (Mathis, 2005:8). 
 
6.3 Anti-dumping and competition policies and institutions in member countries 
South Africa is the only SACU member with domestic anti-dumping law and a domestic 
investigating authority. None of the other member countries have any rules, regulations or 
legislation in place to govern the implementation of anti-dumping measure. The International 
Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) in South Africa is currently undertaking all anti-
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dumping investigations regarding allegations of dumping of goods into the Common 
Customs Area.  
 
Currently South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland have national competition laws 
and South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland have already established national competition 
authorities. Lesotho currently does not have any domestic competition laws or regulatory 
authority (US Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2009).   
 
6.3.1 South Africa 
The South African Competition Act of 1999 is a comprehensive act which allows for the 
creation of different levels of domestic competition authorities. The Act focuses on two main 
areas of anti-competitive behaviour: prohibited practices and merger control. Those practices 
which are prohibited by the Act include restrictive horizontal practices, restrictive vertical 
practices, the abuse of dominance and price discrimination by a dominant firm. 
 
The domestic authorities responsible for the implementation of the competition policy in 
South Africa are the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and the Competition 
Appeals Court. The Commission is the party responsible for ensuring the enforcement of the 
competition policy and investigating any allegations of anti-competitive behaviour. The 
Tribunal adjudicates any disputes arising from a decision by the Commission, while the 
Appeals Court can review any decision made by the Tribunal (SA Competition Act, 1999). 
 
6.3.2 Botswana 
The Competition Bill of 2009 has replaced its predecessor, the National Competition Policy 
of Botswana of 2005. One of the most significant changes the Competition Bill has 
introduced is the creation of the Competition Authority. 
 
The Competition Bill is quite comprehensive and consists out of various parts, including the 
function of the competition authority, restrictive arrangements and the abuse of dominance, 
the prohibition of horizontal and vertical agreements and the control of mergers (Botswana 
Competition Bill, 2009). 
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6.3.3 Lesotho 
Lesotho is the only SACU member country which does not currently have either national 
anti-dumping law or competition policy. However, Lesotho has drafted a draft national 
competition policy which has not yet been implemented. In accordance with the draft national 
policy a Competition Directorate, for the efficient implementation of the competition law, 
will also be created. The Directorate will fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing (Koto, 2010:14-18). Currently economic entities 
are regulated in terms of the provisions contained within the Industrial Property Order, No. 5, 
1989. However, this Order is mainly focused on the registration and protection of trademarks, 
patents, utility model certificates and industrial designs (Industrial Property Order, 1989:2).  
 
6.3.4 Namibia 
The Competition Act of 2003 enshrines the competition laws of Namibia. Prior to the 
enactment of this legislation, competition issues were addressed by the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Amendment Act of 1959. However, this was a piece of South 
African legislation which has not been applied since the independence of Namibia from 
South Africa. The Competition Commission of Namibia was also launched in 2009. 
 
The Competition Act addressed concerns regarding anti-competitive agreements and 
collusion, the abuse of dominance and anti-competitive mergers. The main objectives of the 
Competition Act are to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the Namibian 
economy, increase competitive prices and choices, promote employment, expand Namibia’s 
participation in the global market and improve the spread of ownership (Namibian 
Competition Act, 2003).  
 
6.3.5 Swaziland 
The Competition Act of Swaziland was enacted in 2007. The Act allows for the creation of a 
domestic competition authority and regulates various anti-competitive behaviour in the 
domestic market. The Competition Commission consists out of the Board and Secretariat. 
While the Board is the decision-making body, the Secretariat is responsible for the 
investigation of allegations of anti-competitive behaviour in the domestic industry.  
 
The Competition Act regulates anti-competitive trade practices, unfair trading, the abuse of 
dominance, mergers and acquisitions, monopolies and the concentration of economic power. 
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The Competition Act prohibits anti-competitive behaviour, like price fixing, collusion and the 
collective action to enforce agreements and unfair trading practices, including the exclusion 
of liability for defective products and false representation (Swaziland Competition Act, 
2007).  
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7. Policy options for interaction between anti-dumping and competition policies 
 and institutions 
Over the last decade there has been an increased dissatisfaction with the manner in which 
anti-dumping actions have been implemented, as well as the proliferation of anti-dumping 
measures, especially by developing countries. According to Messerlin (1994:352) the 
suggested solution in order to solve this problem is to replace anti-dumping policies with 
competition rules. However, this will require multilateral competition rules. Thus two other 
policy options have been suggested: the simultaneous implementation of anti-dumping and 
competition policies or the utilisation of competition policy principles in the anti-dumping 
process (Messerlin, 1994:366). 
 
Trade liberalisation through regional integration can impose adjustment costs on the trading 
partners, especially if the regional arrangement is among developing countries. These 
adjustment costs can motivate firms to behave in an anti-competitive manner which can 
decrease the possible short-term benefits countries can get from the regional trade 
liberalisation. However, if governments try to address the anti-competitive behaviour through 
strict trade and competition policies it can significantly increase the burden on these firms 
which are already struggling to adjust to the changes in the market. This creates the potential 
risk that firms will not support any further efforts to reduce trade barriers, harming overall 
trade liberalisation efforts (Bilal & Olerreaga, 1998:164). 
 
Cadot et al (2000:16) states that regional integration can have important implications for the 
conduct of competition policy. On the one hand the elimination of trade barriers among 
trading partners can increase the ability of foreign competitors to enter a domestic market, 
this can reduce the need for domestic competition policies. However, on the other hand for 
trading partners to achieve the full benefits associated with regional integration and internal 
free trade, the member countries must prevent firms in the integrated market from using other 
restrictive practices as a substitute for the reduction in internal barriers. This enforces the 
argument that a regional trade arrangement must incorporate coordinated or harmonised 
competition policies to ensure efficient competition in the regional market. The figure below 
indicates the different possible forms of interaction between anti-dumping policy and 
competition law. 
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Figure 8: Anti-dumping and competition policy options 
 
 
7.1 The complete replacement of anti-dumping policy by competition policy 
The basic premise of substituting competition policy for anti-dumping measures is that once 
anti-dumping measures are removed from a regional arrangement there should be a piece of 
common legislation to counteract any restrictive business practices which may arise. If there 
is no such common competition legislation, countries will have to rely on the extra-territorial 
application of national competition policies to address any restrictive business practices 
among the member countries. Not all countries allow for the extra-territorial application of 
their domestic competition policies. Also in many trade agreements, including SACU, there 
are some member countries which do not have any domestic competition rules. If the extra-
territorial application of domestic laws are possible it can cause conflict among the trading 
partner and harm regional competition. Florencio (2007:21) also states that if competition 
rules are diverse among the member countries it can cause imbalance and disruptions to the 
integration efforts. If a country in the regional context is more leniet in its action towards a 
specific anti-competitive behaviour it can harm the country’s trade performance.  
 
Considering the potential advantages a common competition policy can have in a regional 
arrangement the implementation of common policies to replace anti-dumping law has gained 
some popularity. This has mostly been drawn from successful regional arrangements, like the 
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EC in the abolition of anti-dumping measures through establishing common competition 
legislation (Florencio, 2007:22). However, in these successful regional arrangements member 
countries have had a previous degree of coordination among their public policies, a level of 
institutional commitment and a credible environment to implement these common regional 
provisions. In these situations common competition legislation has the high probability to 
maintain the conditions of competitions among the member countries, without unilateral 
national policies and behaviour undermining the goals of the common policy (Florencio, 
2007:22). 
 
According to Vautier and Lloyd (1997:13) many of the anti-dumping actions currently 
undertaken will not be possible if competition policy is substituted for anti-dumping policies. 
The authors state that the best option available for addressing the proliferation of anti-
dumping measures are the removal of anti-dumping regulations from the WTO and regional 
trade agreements because dumping is not a trade problem, but a pricing problem which is best 
addressed by competition policy (Vautier & Lloyd, 1997:14).  
 
In the context of a regional trade agreement among various countries with different national 
policies and public policy interests the complete removal of anti-dumping policy from the 
arrangement will ultimately require a common competition policy to address anti-competitive 
business practices (Florencio, 2007:22). In his distinction between shallow and deeper 
regional integration Hoekman (1998:4) illustrates the potential benefit of including mutually 
recognised or harmonised competition policies in a regional arrangement. The author sees 
shallow integration when trading partner aim to eliminate discrimination between foreign and 
domestic firms which includes the elimination of border measures and trade remedies. On the 
other hand deeper integration is defined as the deliberate action by governments in the 
various trading partners to either mutually recognise or harmonise national policies. 
Competition policy is one of the policies which can be included into a deeper regional trade 
agenda. Hoekman (1998:5) then continues to illustrate the potential benefit of including 
competition policies in a regional arrangement by equating the situation to a zero sum game. 
On the one hand national competition policies which are efficiently enforced can reduce the 
welfare of a trading partner, while on the other hand there is adjustment costs associated with 
moving from a national competition policy to a mutually recognised or harmonised regional 
regime. In the short term when a country moves away from its current regime a welfare loss 
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can be imposed on the society, but the joint welfare can be increased in the long-run through 
these coordinated competition policies (Hoekman, 1998:6).  
 
However, Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:25) give three conditions which are needed to fully 
eliminate the use of anti-dumping measures in a regional arrangement:  
a) free trade and the freedom of investment;  
b) the existence of disciplines for governments to be able to assist firms and industries in 
their own territory, and  
c) existing and enforceable competition legislation.  
 
According to the authors these conditions will implicitly guarantee market access and 
maintain the conditions of competition in the regional market.   
 
7.2 Simultaneous implementation of competition and anti-dumping policies 
This option requires that a competition case be launched at the same time an anti-dumping 
investigation is initiated (Messerlin, 1994:366). This process can follow the following 
sequence:  
1. With the request of an anti-dumping investigation by the domestic industry the anti-
dumping investigating authority need to inform the competition authority of the 
request for the investigation.  
2. The competition authority will then investigate the conditions of competition in the 
exporter’s home market and the contestability of the relevant domestic market, 
investigating the prevailing market conditions, extent of competition and regulatory 
environment and whether the exporting firm is engaged in anti-competitive behaviour 
or has abuse its dominant position.  
3. The anti-dumping investigating authority will have to be kept fully informed on all 
the findings of the competition authority and be given all the available information 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:18).  
 
However, due to the differences between anti-dumping and competition rules this approach is 
seen as being high unlikely. The possibility exists that there will be a significant difference in 
the time periods required for the two investigation processes, mainly due to the constraint of 
confidentiality. Any confidential information used in respect of the anti-dumping action can 
not be utilised during the anti-competitive investigation and vice versa. This can result in 
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asymmetric behaviour with firms being cooperative in the anti-dumping investigation while 
reluctant to cooperate and provide information on the situation of their domestic market for 
the anti-competitive investigation (Messerlin, 1994:366). 
 
7.3 Utilising competition principles in the anti-dumping investigation process 
This option will require the gradual use of competition principles in anti-dumping 
proceedings. However, this does not require that all cases of dumping be investigated as 
predatory pricing or price discrimination, but rather that competition policy will ensure that 
competitive conditions in the regional arrangements are not distorted due to inconsistent and 
different public policies (Florencio, 2007:25).  
 
Competition principles are an important part of anti-dumping proceedings, especially in the 
context of a regional trade arrangement, because the applicable remedies can have a 
significant impact on the competitive conditions in the regional configuration. The gradual 
utilisation of competition policy in anti-dumping investigations is expected to promote a 
concern of the different public policy objectives among members and the importance of 
competitive conditions in the regional arrangement (Florencio, 2007:26). By incorporating 
competition principles into anti-dumping law the focus can be moved away from determining 
the injury to the domestic industry as competitors, towards the injury to domestic competition 
(Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:22). This can lead to anti-dumping duties only being 
implemented after a cost-benefit analysis reveals that the advantage for the domestic 
economy of imposing anti-dumping duties outweighs the potential disadvantages of higher 
duties.  
 
In terms of conforming anti-dumping law with competition policy there are some important 
competition concepts which need to be incorporated into anti-dumping law, the most 
important being that of defining the market and dumping (Harriott, 2010:7).  
 
7.3.1 Defining the market 
In the context of anti-dumping law the market is defined in terms of the domestic producers 
currently in the domestic market which excludes the current and future exporters in the 
market (Harriott, 2010:7). Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:25) also state that anti-dumping 
law defines the domestic market in terms of the like product in the domestic industry. If the 
like product is defined too strict it can lead to an overestimation of the effects of dumping. 
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This can lead to allowing the imposition of anti-dumping duties in those cases where anti-
dumping duties are not actually justified (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 1994:25).  
 
This is inconsistent with the definition of the market in competition policy which defines the 
market in such a manner as to identify the set of products which can be affected by anti-
competitive behaviour. If the market is incorrectly defined then it is unlikely that the 
competitive or anti-competitive effect of the challenged conduct can be correctly identified 
(Harriott, 2010:7). According to Harriott (2010:8) the market can be defined as “a product or 
group of products and a geographical area in which it is produced or sold…” This definition 
recognises the important role both existing and potential importers and import products play 
in correctly defining the market. The definition is also consumer orientated in that it identifies 
the set of products the consumers perceive to be substitutable in order to satisfy a specific 
need. The technology used to produce and market a specific product is of little significance to 
the definition of the market, ceteris paribus. 
 
7.3.2 Dumping 
In terms of anti-dumping law dumping occurs when the export price of a product is less than 
the price of the like product in the home market. Dumping is prohibited when it causes injury 
to the domestic producers of the like product in the export market. However, in terms of 
competition policy dumping can be defined as price discrimination which can be either 
beneficial or detrimental to the welfare of consumers, depending on the conditions of a 
particular market.  
 
According to Harriott (2010:9) dumping should actually be challenged based on the potential 
adverse effect dumping as price discrimination or predatory pricing can have on competition 
in the domestic market. The test to determine whether dumping is prohibited in a particular 
case needs to be sufficient to identify those conditions under which dumping will actually be 
beneficial to the domestic consumers. However, this is not currently the case in anti-dumping 
law which can challenge conduct which is not likely to harm the domestic market. In order to 
successfully harmonise existing anti-dumping and competition principles the method used to 
determine whether dumping is potentially harmful must be improved in order to filter that 
conduct which has the potential to harm to domestic industry from the conduct which is 
unlikely to cause harm.  
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In applying the theory of price discrimination the price tends to be lower in the market where 
the consumers are more sensitive to higher prices. Thus the anti-dumping investigation will 
need to compare the characteristics of the consumers in the home market with that of the 
consumers in the export market. This comparison will need to take an important factor into 
account, which is that of transaction costs associated with acquiring a specific product. 
Generally transaction costs for the consumers in the export market will be higher when they 
are acquiring an imported product. This is due to shipping costs, including insurance and 
freight and the costs associated with the product clearing the border, including tariffs, duties 
and fees. The demand for an import product can be derived based on the fact that the foreign 
firms will only export the product if the importers in the export market can resell the product 
at a profit to the consumers in the domestic market. If the importers of the product compete 
with domestic producers which are not faced by the challenge of transaction costs then the 
exporting firms need to offer the import products at a discount in the export market in order 
to stimulate the derived demand in the export market (Harriott, 2010:10). The importers of a 
specific product are also more likely to be sensitive to price increases than the domestic 
consumers of the same product in the home market. It is thus reasonable to expect that the 
price in the export market is lower than the price in the home market. According to Harriott 
(2010:11) the argument can then be made that dumping is necessary in most cases to 
stimulate the demand for a specific product in the export market and maintain the 
contestability of the export market. 
 
7.3.3 Determination of injury 
In an anti-dumping investigation injury can be determined if the investigating authority finds 
that price depression or price undercutting has taken place in the domestic market. However, 
if the complainant is a firm with market power in the domestic firm entry by foreign firms 
can lead to a reduction in price and a decline in the market share and profits of the domestic 
dominant firm. Thus the test to determine whether dumping has caused injury in the market is 
more associated with protecting a dominant producer in the market, rather than protecting the 
domestic market itself. According to Harriott (2010:12-13) the very conditions which serve 
as evidence that dumping has caused material injury is one of the consequences which 
naturally flows from increased and enhanced competition in the market.  
 
The mere fact that the price in the export market is lower than the price in the home market of 
a firm is no more indicative of the potential harm to the domestic industry than if the export 
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price was higher than the normal value. A more useful benchmark will be to establish the 
extent to which the export price is below the cost of making the product available to the 
consumer in the home market of the producer, thus establishing the resale below cost price 
(Harriott, 2010:14). In order to establish that dumping causes harm to the domestic industry, 
the investigating authority will have to demonstrate that the resale below cost price is likely 
to cause injury to competition in the domestic market, not necessarily the domestic producers. 
In order to establish harm to competition, harm to the consumer and equally efficient 
producers competing in the export market will need to be demonstrated (Harriott, 2010:15). 
 
7.3.4 Public interest clause 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:22) state that a public interest clause can also be included into 
anti-dumping law. This will require the investigating authority to examine the impact of anti-
dumping duties on the intermediate users of the imported product and the final consumers. 
Effectively, the anti-dumping investigation will then allow for those that will be affected 
negatively by the implementation of an anti-dumping duty to defend their interests by giving 
them the opportunity to present their arguments to the investigating authority with the legal 
standing to do so.  
 
7.3.5 De minimis requirements 
According to Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:24) the de minimis requirements currently in the 
GATT 1994 and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement can be increased. Although this is not 
strictly linked to standard competition principles, by increasing these current requirements 
there can be enhanced competition by limiting the space for applying anti-dumping measures. 
The current de minimis requirements are quite low, if these are increased, then the situations 
in which anti-dumping measures can be implemented will severely be limited. 
 
The existing definitions of dumping and the market in anti-dumping law, as well as the test 
for determining injury during the investigation is against the basic premise of economic 
theory associated with increased competition in an imperfectly competitive market (Harriott, 
2010:14). In order for anti-dumping law and competition policy to be harmonised the 
definition of the market under anti-dumping law must be expanded to include all current and 
potential suppliers of the specific product in the market, regardless of whether the product is 
domestically produced or imported. The circumstances under which dumping can be 
challenged and the evidence associated with establishing material injury to the domestic 
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market must also be revised. Competition policy provides a better benchmark for challenging 
a specific pricing strategy. Prices are determined by the characteristic of the market in which 
the product is sold. Thus if the market is characterised by consumers which are more 
sensitive to price increased the price will be lower and vice versa.  
 
7.4 Anti-dumping measures as a mechanism of last resort 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994:25) create a fourth option for the possible interaction between 
competition and anti-dumping option: securing an agreement among the trading partners that 
anti-dumping measures will only be used as a mechanism of last resort. In order for this to be 
achieved there needs to be an arrangement among the countries that any allegation of 
dumping first be investigated by the competition authority. The objective of the initial 
investigation is to establish whether the exporting firm is able to dump in the importing 
market either through engaging in anti-competitive behaviour or due to benefits received 
from government created or supported barriers to entry. If the first is found, Hoekman and 
Mavroidis (1994:26) state that the standard competition remedies will apply, including cease 
and desist orders or fines. Only if the competition authority finds the existence of entry 
barriers will an anti-dumping investigation be initiated. 
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8. Suitable policy options for SACU 
SACU is a customs union with the agenda for deeper regional integration among the member 
states. The 2002 SACU Agreement allows for a common regional policy in terms of anti-
dumping, the establishment of a regional body to evaluate the implementation of any anti-
dumping duties and national bodies in each member country to investigate any allegation of 
dumping in the region. In terms of competition policy the 2002 SACU Agreement only states 
that member countries should cooperation on issues of competition in terms of each country’s 
domestic competition policy. Currently the common anti-dumping policy has not been 
developed, the regional body has not been established and no members, except South Africa, 
have implemented a national body and domestic legislation to address dumping. Thus far the 
South African national body, ITAC is undertaking all investigations pertaining to an 
allegation of dumping in the SACU domestic market. However, all member countries, except 
Lesotho, have national competition policies in place. 
 
This poses an opportunity for the SACU member countries, seeing that anti-dumping rules 
are a measure of protectionism and can decrease intra-regional trade and welfare. In 
developing the regional and national policies on anti-dumping the SACU member states can 
follow the two main stream approaches. The first is the incorporation of various competition 
principles into anti-dumping rules to limit the negative welfare and anti-competitive effects of 
utilising anti-dumping measures, while the second is the abolition of anti-dumping measures 
in the region which is then replaced by competition policy. The option best suited for SACU 
depends on the differing viewpoints on implementing anti-dumping measures in a customs 
union. If it is possible to implement anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade, just as 
long as substantially all the trade in the customs union will remain free from restrictions, the 
most suitable option for SACU will be to incorporate competition principles into anti-
dumping policies. If the SACU member countries are of the view that anti-dumping measures 
have no place in a customs union the current best option is the elimination of anti-dumping 
measures on intra-SACU trade and utilising coordinated competition policies to address 
dumping as price discrimination and predatory pricing.  
 
8.1 Incorporating competition principles into anti-dumping policies 
The first possible option allow for the gradual use of competition principles in anti-dumping 
proceedings. However, this does not require that all cases of dumping be investigated as 
predatory pricing or price discrimination, but rather that competition policy will ensure that 
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the competitive conditions in the regional arrangements are not distorted due to inconsistent 
and different public policies. Competition principles are an important part of anti-dumping 
proceedings, especially in the context of a regional trade arrangement because the applicable 
remedies can have a significant impact on the competitive conditions in the regional 
configuration. The gradual utilisation of competition policy in anti-dumping investigations is 
expected to promote a concern of the different public policy objectives among members and 
the importance of competitive conditions in the regional arrangement (Florencio, 2007:26).  
 
The literature indicates that this seems to be the most suitable option to eliminate anti-
dumping measures from a regional configuration where the member countries are active users 
of these instruments. Florencio (2007:26) for instance has suggested this option as the best 
solution in MERCOSUR, were member countries Brazil and Argentina are major users of 
anti-dumping measures with the majority of measures implemented against each other and 
other members (Paraguay and Uruguay) of the free trade arrangement. This is not quite the 
same situation in SACU. As previously stated SACU member countries, except South Africa, 
are not users of anti-dumping measures. South Africa has also not implemented anti-dumping 
measures on the imports from the rest of SACU. Although this can be for various reasons, the 
most significant contribution to the lack of intra-regional anti-dumping measures is the 
absence of national legislation and a regional mandate which enable countries to implement 
intra-regional anti-dumping measures. However, if the SACU member countries determine 
that they want to be able to implement anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade various 
challenges must be overcome, especially regional and national institutional deficiencies. In 
order for SACU member countries to receive the full benefit of addressing dumping through 
the utilisation of rules which is in line with competition policies, rather than anti-dumping 
measures national and regional bodies and rules must be established through further trade 
negotiations.  
 
The member countries within SACU have different national policies with different goals, 
objectives and public policy interests. The lack of anti-dumping policies in most member 
countries make it difficult to address dumping in the customs union, while the lack of 
competition policy in Lesotho hinders the ability of countries to address anti-competitive 
behaviour in the region. The utilisation of this option to gradually introduce competition 
principles in anti-dumping proceedings does not require a common competition policy, but 
the cooperation among member countries in terms of competition, but also public policy 
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objectives. The 2002 SACU Agreements require members to develop a common industrial 
policy and policy on unfair trade practices. This will encompass the public policy interests of 
each member state, while coordinating anti-dumping action among members. However, since 
these policies are still being developed competition policy principles can be included in the 
common policy on unfair trade practices which will enable all SACU member countries to 
address dumping and anti-competitive behaviour in the regional configuration.  
 
8.2 Replacement of anti-dumping policies with common competition policy 
If the SACU member countries decide that the most appropriate action to follow in terms of 
intra-regional anti-dumping measures are the elimination of these measures a common 
competition policy or coordination among competition authorities are required. If the use of 
anti-dumping policies are eliminated and there is a lack of a common competition policy it 
will be required that member countries apply national policies on an extra-territorial basis. 
However, due to a lack of competition policy in Lesotho this member state will not be able to 
address anti-competitive business practices, while the other member countries will be able to 
implement their domestic policies. The extra-territorial application of national laws can also 
create a high level of conflict of interest among SACU members and increase trade barriers 
due to different public policy objectives, procedures and penalties. This is inconsistent with 
the basic nature of a regional trade arrangement (Florencio, 2007:21). 
 
The table below shows a comparison among the domestic competition policies of Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The competition policies of all four countries include 
provisions on the abuse of a dominant position by a firm, the extra-territorial application of 
national law and cooperation among competition authorities in the different jurisdictions. The 
different provisions on extra-territorial application and cooperation are similar, while there 
are a number of differences in the various provisions about the abuse of a dominant position. 
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Table 6: Comparison among the Competition Acts in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa 
and Swaziland 
Botswana Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
Competition Act, 2009 Competition Act, 2003 Competition Act, 1999 Competition Act, 2007 
 Restrictive business 
practices 
 Anti-competitive 
practices 
  
  
 Decisions by firms to 
prevent or limit 
competition in trade in 
goods and services are 
prohibited 
   Practices that prevent, 
restrict or distort 
competition are 
prohibited 
Abuse of a dominant position 
 Any conduct by any firm 
is subject to prohibition if 
it is an abuse of a 
dominant position in any 
market  
 A dominant position is 
any firm with the 
economic strength to 
allow the firm to change 
prices or output without 
resistance from 
competitors 
  
  
 Conduct by a firm(s) that is 
an abuse of a dominant 
position in the Namibian 
market is prohibited 
 An abuse of a dominant 
position include: 
(a) imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices  
(b) limiting or restricting 
market access 
 Price discrimination by a 
dominant firm is prohibited 
if the effect will lessen or 
prevent competition 
 Price discrimination involves 
discriminating between 
purchasers in terms of the 
price charged for goods and 
services 
 Price discrimination will not 
be prohibited if it is only due 
to cost differences or in good 
faith to meet the price of a 
competitor 
  
 Firms will refrain from 
actions that limited 
market access, unduly 
restrain competition or 
adversely affect trade, 
including: 
(a) predatory behaviour 
(b) discriminatory pricing 
 A person in a dominant 
position shall not use its 
power to participate in 
anti-competitive 
practices 
Extra-territorial application 
 The law is applicable to all 
economic activity in 
Botswana or having an 
effect in Botswana 
  
 The law is applicable to all 
economy activity in 
Namibia or having an 
effect in Namibia 
  
 The law is applicable to all 
economic activity in South 
Africa or having an effect in 
South Africa 
 If jurisdiction falls under 
another Regulatory 
Authority the law establishes 
concurrent jurisdiction over 
the matter 
 The law is applicable to 
all economic activity in 
Swaziland or having an 
effect in Swaziland 
  
Cooperation among Competition Authorities 
 The Competition 
Authority can liaise or 
exchange information, 
knowledge and expertise 
with a similar foreign 
Authority 
 The Competition 
Commission can liaise or 
exchange information, 
knowledge and expertise 
with a similar foreign 
Authority   
 The President may assign the 
Competition Commission 
with any duty in terms of an 
international agreement to 
exchange information with a 
similar foreign agency 
 The Competition 
Commission can 
cooperate with similar 
regional and 
international bodies 
Source: Competition Acts of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland 
 
Currently no national legislation of the SACU member countries allow for the intra-regional 
application of anti-dumping measures. The 2002 SACU agreement only states that the 
provisions regarding intra-regional anti-dumping measures will be drawn up by member 
states and annexed to the agreement. However, no such annex is currently in existence. Thus 
if the SACU countries wish to eliminate the use of anti-dumping measures on intra-regional 
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trade no amendments need to be made to national anti-dumping legislation, although an 
amendment to the 2002 SACU agreement will be required. This will need to state that the use 
of anti-dumping measures on intra-SACU trade is prohibited and which mechanism will be 
used to protect member countries against the case of goods imported at an export price which 
is lower than the normal value in the exporting country. To use competition policy to address 
dumping will require either a common regional competition policy, like in the case of the 
European Union, or a regional coordination mechanism for coordinating national competition 
policies among member countries (similar to ANCZERTA). 
 
Currently the 2002 SACU agreement does not allow for a harmonised regional competition 
policy, but coordination among the member states on competition issues. Thus the NAFTA-
type intra-regional competition policies, for example policies applied in ANCZERTA and the 
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, seem to be the best model for SACU to follow. 
Although this is simpler than the harmonisation of competition policies among the member 
states, there are still regional and national deficiencies that will need to be addressed in order 
to coordinate national competition policies among SACU members.  
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9. Institutional development required for effective implementation 
In order to have an effective interaction between anti-dumping and competition policies, 
irrespective of which policy combination is chosen, regional and national policies and 
authorities will have to be created, adapted and/or amended. The required amendments will 
all depend on the policy option combination chosen by the SACU member states. 
 
9.1 Regional institutions and policy 
Depending on whether the choice is to retain the use of anti-dumping measures in accordance 
with competition principles or to eliminate intra-regional anti-dumping measures and 
coordinate national competition policies the following regional institutions and policies are 
required: 
 If the SACU member countries choose to retain anti-dumping measures the SACU 
annex on intra-regional anti-dumping measures (unfair trade practices) will need to be 
developed and the Tariff Board established. The annex will have to include a detailed 
mechanism on how dumping will be determined and anti-dumping measures 
implemented in the context of a customs union. The basic rules and regulations on the 
implementation of anti-dumping measures will have to incorporate those previously 
stated competition principles, including the determination of dumping and injury and 
defining the market. 
 If the decision is made to prohibited intra-SACU anti-dumping measures and 
coordinate competition policies limited changes need to made on the regional level. 
The 2002 SACU agreement already allows for coordination among domestic 
authorities on competition issues, but does not prohibit intra-regional anti-dumping 
measures. Thus the 2002 SACU agreement will require an amendment to explicitly 
prohibit the use of intra-SACU anti-dumping measures and an addition to clarify the 
specific nature of cooperation among national authorities. This can take the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding as in the case of the Canada-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement. 
 
9.2 National institutions and policy 
Whether the SACU member states chose to continue to allow for the use of intra-regional 
anti-dumping measures or prohibit these measures will determine which national institutions 
and policies will have to be created and amended: 
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 If the first option is chosen various national legislation will have to be drafted and 
incorporated in order to effectively implement this policy option. None of SACU 
member states currently have national legislation in place to enable intra-SACU anti-
dumping measures. This will require all countries to draft these national policies in 
accordance with the previously stated competition principles. Botswana, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland will also have to establish the required national authorities 
needed to implement and administer these measures.  
 If the member countries chose to prohibit intra-SACU anti-dumping measures the 
member countries will have to ensure that domestic competition law and authorities 
are in place. Currently Lesotho does not have either domestic legislation or a national 
competition authority. This caveat will have to be addressed if countries wish to 
coordinate actions on the issues of competition. Although the rest of SACU does have 
domestic legislation in place, amendments might be required to create the mandate for 
effective coordination and notification among national authorities.  
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10. Conclusion 
Trade and competition policy can be stated to be at odds with one another. Trade policy 
addresses issues at the border, deals with government-imposed trade barriers, has been 
negotiated on a multilateral and bilateral level and is enforced by both national and 
international law. Competition policy, on the other hand, addresses issues pertaining to 
competition in a country’s borders, deals with private sector barriers to competition and 
operates mainly under national law. Competition and trade policy are imperfect substitutes in 
terms of the impact of these policies on market openness and structure. The goals of 
competition and trade policy can also be seen as being complementary. Trade policy allows 
for the possibility of increased competition, while competition policy ensures that private 
stakeholders do not distort competition. The more restrictive the trade policy regime in a 
country is, the more important the role of competition policy to reduce the possible negative 
welfare effects of reducing competition due to the restriction of competitive markets. 
However, using competition policy to offset the possible distortion of domestic competition 
created by an active trade policy will not necessarily enhance welfare. The preferable policy 
option is to minimise the extent to which trade policy reduces the contestability of the 
domestic market through a liberal external policy stance. 
 
The most commonly used arguments to justify the use of anti-dumping measures, as a trade 
policy instrument, are to address price discrimination and predatory pricing. However, it has 
long been recognised that price discrimination does not necessarily have anti-competitive 
affects on the market. The ability of a firm to charge different prices in segmented markets 
can just be a natural consequence of a highly competitive market. Although predation can be 
a viable argument for anti-dumping measure justification, predation is the exception rather 
than the rule in the real world. There are various barriers to a firm establishing global 
dominance: high elasticity’s of demand; very low barriers to exit and the ability of the firm to 
eliminate both domestic and international competitors form the markets in a global market 
which are highly competitive and integrated. The inclusion of anti-dumping measures in a 
regional trade agreement, whether to protect against price discrimination or predatory pricing 
is seen as being against the basic premise of a trade liberalisation. Anti-dumping increases the 
prices of the specific product in the domestic market, can reduce the contestability of the 
domestic market, provide incentives for collusion among firms and lead to trade diversion. 
However, no definitive answer on the legitimacy of anti-dumping measures has been 
provided by the WTO, WTO member states or the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
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The 2002 SACU Agreement contains basic provisions on unfair trade practices and 
competition policy. However, these provisions do not provision for either the elimination of 
anti-dumping measures from intra-regional trade or the development and implementation of 
common competition policies among members. The agreement calls for the development of 
common anti-dumping policies and instrument, but these instruments are yet to be created. 
The agreement requires each member state to have its own domestic competition policies and 
require member states cooperate in order to ensure the efficient application of these domestic 
laws. Currently Lesotho does not have any domestic competition policies or domestic 
authority and South Africa is the only member country which has anti-dumping legislation 
and an investigating authority. There are various policy options available for SACU to create 
an efficient interaction between anti-dumping law and competition policies in intra-regional 
trade. However, the most suitable option will depend on the view of the SACU member states 
on the appropriateness of anti-dumping measures in a customs union. Irrespective of which 
policy option the SACU member countries chose a variety of regional and national 
institutions and policies will have to be created, amended and implemented to have an 
effective and efficient interaction between anti-dumping and competition policy. Member 
countries will need to meet around the negotiating table to determine the institutions, 
competition principles and the manner of cooperation and enforcement that will best serve 
the purpose of eliminating anti-dumping measures on intra-regional trade in the long-run.    
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12. Addendum A: Applicable products and product sectors 
Sector Products in sector 
I Live animals; animal products 
II Vegetable products 
IV 
Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes 
VI Products of the chemical or allied industries 
VII Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof 
X 
Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) 
paper or paperboard; paper and paperboard  
XI Textiles and textile articles 
XII 
Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, 
whips, riding-crops and parts thereof; prepared feathers and articles made 
therewith; artificial flowers; articles of human hair 
XIII 
Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials; ceramic 
products; glass and glassware 
XV Base metals and articles of base metal 
XVI 
Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment; parts thereof; 
sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles 
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment 
XVIII 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical 
or surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments; 
parts and accessories thereof 
XX Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
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13. Addendum B: Developing countries by region 
North Africa East Asia Caribbean 
Algeria Brunei Darussalam Barbados 
Egypt China Cuba 
Libya Hong Kong  Dominican Republic 
Morocco Indonesia Guyana 
Tunisia Malaysia Haiti 
Sub-Saharan Africa Myanmar Jamaica 
Central Africa Papua New Guinea Trinidad and Tobago 
Cameroon Philippines Mexico and Central America 
Central African Republic Republic of Korea Costa Rica 
Chad Singapore El Salvador 
Congo Taiwan Province of China Guatemala 
Equatorial Guinea Thailand Honduras 
Gabon Viet Nam Mexico 
Sao Tome and Principe South Asia Nicaragua 
East Africa Bangladesh Panama 
Burundi India South America 
Comoros Iran (Islamic Republic of ) Argentina 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Nepal Bolivia  
Djibouti Pakistan Brazil 
Eritrea Sri Lanka Chile 
Ethiopia Western Asia Colombia 
Kenya Bahrain Ecuador 
Madagascar Iraq Paraguay 
Rwanda Israel Peru 
Somalia Jordan Uruguay 
Sudan Kuwait Venezuela  
Uganda Lebanon 
  
United Republic of Tanzania Oman 
Southern Africa Qatar 
Angola Saudi Arabia 
Botswana Syrian Arab Republic 
Lesotho Turkey 
Malawi United Arab Emirates 
Mauritius Yemen 
Mozambique 
  
Namibia 
South Africa 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
West Africa 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
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Cape Verde 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
114 
 
14. Addendum C: Anti-dumping measures by exporting countries 
Developing Exporting 
Country 1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
T
o
ta
l 
Algeria           1     1                 2 
Argentina 3       1 1 3 1 1   2 1 2   1 1 2 19 
Bangladesh             1             1       2 
Brazil 9 
1
0 7 6 5 8 2 6 4 3 5 5 2 2 3 3 2 82 
Chile   1 1 3     4 4 1 1   1 1       1 18 
China 
2
6 
1
6 
3
3 
2
4 
2
1 
3
0 
3
2 
3
6 
4
1 
4
4 
4
2 
3
8 
4
8 
5
3 
5
6 
5
3 
3
7 
63
0 
Colombia 1       1                         2 
Cuba           1                       1 
Dominican Republic               1                   1 
Ecuador 1               1   1             3 
Egypt     2   2                 1       5 
Guatemala                 1                 1 
Honduras         1                         1 
Hong Kong, China   3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2       1   2 1   16 
India 4 1 5 7 9 7 6 6 7 
1
0 2 
1
2 3 6 4 2 3 94 
Indonesia   2 4 7 4 
1
1 5 9 
1
2 2 7 
1
0 3 6 7 8 4 
10
1 
Iran, Islamic Republic of           1 2   1 2 1       1     8 
Israel 1       1   1 1 1             1   6 
Jordan               1                   1 
Korea, Republic of 4 6 3 
1
4 
1
5 
2
3 
1
2 
1
3 
2
2 
1
3 8 
1
0 6 8 7 3 4 
17
1 
Kuwait                               1   1 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya               1                   1 
Malawi             1                     1 
Malaysia 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 4 3 6 3 6 5 2 7 3 5 65 
Mexico   3 4 1 3 4 1 4   3 2 1 2 1 1 2   32 
Nepal               2                   2 
Nigeria                   1               1 
Oman               1               1   2 
Pakistan 1   1       1   1 2               6 
Paraguay 1       1                     1   3 
Peru                             1     1 
Philippines     1     1   1 1     3           7 
Qatar               1                   1 
Saudi Arabia       1 1 1 1 1     1   1   1 2   10 
Singapore       3   3   7 7 1   2 5 3   1   32 
South Africa 2 3 2 2 3 4 3 7 8         4   1 1 40 
Sri Lanka                   1         1     2 
Trinidad and Tobago     1         1                   2 
Turkey 1 1 1 2 4 3 3 3 2 2       3   1 2 28 
United Arab Emirates             1 1   1 1 1   1 1   1 8 
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Uruguay             1       1     1       3 
Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of 4 1   1   2   1 2 1               12 
Viet Nam       1   1 1   1 2 4 2 2 2 4 2   22 
Zimbabwe     1                             1 
Thailand 5 8 2 5 1 
1
2 8 8 8 6 6 8 4 4 
1
0 7 7 
10
9 
 
 
Developed Exporting 
Country 1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
T
o
ta
l 
Armenia                             1     1 
Australia     1 1 2 2     1 2       2   1   12 
Austria 1     3   2             1   2     9 
Belarus   1       3 4 3 1 1 1     1 1     16 
Belgium   1   4 5     2 2   1       1   1 17 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   1                             1 2 
Bulgaria 2   1   2 1 1 2   1   1 1     1   13 
Canada 1     2 1     4 4 1     1 2 1     17 
Croatia   2       1   1     1             5 
Czech Republic 1 1 1   1 4 1 3 1 1         1     15 
Denmark 1     1   1 1                     4 
Estonia         1     1 1                 3 
European Union     1 1 4 4 8 6 7 6 3 3 1 3 1 4 4 56 
Faeroe Islands                   1               1 
Finland       1 1 2     1 2 2 1   1       11 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia   1     1   1   1         1       5 
France 1 1 2 5 7 3 4 1 1   2       2   1 30 
Georgia                 1                 1 
Germany 4 2 2 6 5 7 1 6 4     1   3 4     45 
Greece       2       1 1           1     5 
Hungary   1     2 2   2 1               1 9 
Ireland         2             1           3 
Italy 2 2 1 7 5 1 2 4 2   1       1   2 30 
Japan 5 6 5 9 
1
1 
2
2 9 5 
1
1 6 7 8 4 4   2 3 
11
7 
Kazakhstan     2 2 4   1 2 7       1 1       20 
Latvia       1 1   4   1                 7 
Liechtenstein     1                             1 
Lithuania         1 1   1                   3 
Moldova 1           2 1                   4 
Netherlands 2   1 2 1 3 1 2 2   1       1 1   17 
New Zealand       1     1   1             1   4 
Norway     1             1   1         1 4 
Poland 1 1 3 2 4 2 4 1 1 1 1             21 
Portugal     1 1 1     1                   4 
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Romania 2 1 1 2 2 4 1 4 5 2 1 1     1   1 28 
Russian Federation 8 3 9 5 
1
6 8 8 4 
1
3 5 6 3 1 6   3 1 99 
Serbia and Montenegro           1 1         1           3 
Slovak Republic     1   2 1   2 1   1             8 
Slovenia   1                               1 
Spain 3     4 4 3 3 3   1 1     1 1   1 25 
Sweden       4 1 1     1   1 1   1 1     11 
Switzerland       1           1     1         3 
Taipei, Chinese 2 2 7 
1
2 8 
1
7 9 
1
3 
1
1 
1
0 8 7 7 8 7 7 5 
14
0 
Ukraine 5 1 3 5 7 8 7 5 6   1 2 1     1   52 
United Kingdom 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 5 1     1     2 1   25 
United States 8 4 9 
1
2 8 
1
3 4 
1
0 6 
1
0 
1
3 9 4 7 5 7 7 
13
6 
Uzbekistan                   1               1 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal 
Republic of   1                               1 
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15. Addendum D: Anti-dumping measures by reporting countries 
Developing Reporting 
Member 1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
T
o
ta
l 
Argentina 
1
3 
2
0 
1
1 
1
2 9 
1
5 
1
6 
2
2 
2
0 1 8 5 
1
0 6 
1
5 
1
5 8 
20
6 
Brazil 2 6 2 
1
4 5 9 
1
3 5 2 5 3   9 
1
1 
1
6 4 
1
3 
11
9 
Chile 2   2 2                 1   1 1   9 
China       3 2 5   5 
3
3 
1
4 
1
6 
2
4 
1
2 4 
1
2 
1
5 6 
15
1 
Colombia 1 1 1   6 2       1 1 1 7   3     24 
Costa Rica                 1       2         3 
Dominican Republic                                 1 1 
Egypt       5 
1
4 1 2 7 4 1   
1
2 2 3   1 1 53 
Guatemala     1                             1 
India 7 2 8 
2
2 
2
3 
5
5 
3
8 
6
4 
5
2 
2
9 
1
8 
1
6 
2
5 
3
1 
3
0 
3
2 
2
6 
47
8 
Indonesia     4 2 7   1   1 8 4 2   5 1 5 2 42 
Israel 1     6 4   1 2   1   3 1     2 1 22 
Jamaica             1 2   1               4 
Korea, Republic of   5 
1
0 8   5   1 4 
1
0 3 8   
1
2 4   2 72 
Malaysia   2 2 4 1 1   1 7   7             25 
Mexico 
1
6 4 7 7 7 6 3 4 7 7 8 5     1 2 1 85 
Nicaragua         1                         1 
Pakistan               1 2 4 1 6 4   6 5 7 36 
Paraguay         1         1               2 
Peru 2 2 3   3 4 1 7 7 8 3 4 1   2 1 1 49 
Philippines   2 1 1 3 4                       11 
Singapore 2                                 2 
South Africa   8 
1
8 
1
3 
3
6 
1
3 5 
1
5 1 4   7 1 3 3 1   
12
8 
Thailand     1 2       1 
2
0 1 2   1   3   3 34 
Trinidad and Tobago       2   1 2   1 1               7 
Turkey 
1
1       1 8 2 
1
1 
2
8 
1
6 9 
2
1 6 
1
1 9 
1
0 2 
14
5 
Uruguay       1                           1 
Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of 2   4   8 9   1   1               25 
 
Developed Reporting 
Member 1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
T
o
ta
l 
Australia 1 1 1 
2
0 6 5 
1
1 9 
1
0 4 3 5 1 3 2 2 5 89 
Canada 7   7 
1
0 
1
0 
1
4 
1
9   5 8 4   3 3 2 3 1 96 
Czech Republic           1                       1 
European Union 
1
5 
2
3 
2
3 
2
8 
1
8 
4
1 
1
3 
2
5 2 
1
0 
2
0 
1
2 
1
2 
1
5 9 5 
1
1 
28
2 
Japan 1             2           4       7 
Latvia               1 1                 2 
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Lithuania             7                     7 
New Zealand 3 4   1     2 1   2 4 2 3       2 24 
Poland       1   6     2                 9 
Taipei, Chinese     1 5 1 1   2       1 1     2 1 15 
Ukraine             1 2 2 2 6 2 1 5 7     28 
United States 
3
3 
1
2 
2
0 
1
2 
2
4 
3
1 
3
3 
2
7 
1
2 
1
4 
1
8 5 5 
2
3 
1
5 
1
7 4 
30
5 
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16. Addendum E: Intra-SACU imports 
Botswana imports from the rest of SACU 
Secti
on 
Description 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C01 
Live animals, animal 
products 63.42 69.53 66.39 
66.7
3 
56.2
7 
63.5
4 74.58 
74.2
9 
93.6
2 88.19 
C02 Vegetable products 
195.1
6 
172.8
0 
155.6
4 
130.
26 
128.
46 
148.
56 174.42 
170.
83 
178.
30 194.68 
C03 
Animal or vegetable 
fats & oils 26.36 36.39 26.23 
24.6
0 
24.8
4 
36.4
0 50.36 
30.7
0 
34.5
9 43.69 
C04 
Food, beverages & 
tobacco 
206.2
2 
268.8
6 
204.4
2 
196.
88 
192.
34 
253.
14 302.87 
318.
33 
376.
08 405.63 
C05 Mineral products 
256.5
9 
227.4
7 
433.4
2 
534.
76 
613.
93 
702.
00 
1,020.
63 
765.
89 
980.
45 
1,221.
14 
C06 Chemical products 
192.9
8 
296.1
9 
223.2
7 
226.
95 
250.
61 
286.
25 289.96 
309.
63 
348.
53 381.12 
C07 Plastic products 
114.7
6 
148.4
6 
115.6
6 
112.
43 
115.
17 
154.
52 170.56 
151.
28 
174.
59 197.89 
C08 Raw hides  4.35 5.42 4.22 4.81 5.41 5.60 7.04 7.26 7.28 7.02 
C09 Wood products 44.60 53.01 39.67 
41.2
3 
32.2
2 
42.2
0 58.56 
58.0
1 
60.3
0 64.97 
C10 Paper products 
127.6
5 
264.4
4 80.39 
76.2
6 
76.0
8 
88.2
3 91.95 
100.
10 
105.
63 115.85 
C11 Textiles & clothing 95.18 
148.4
6 
107.7
4 
96.6
1 
96.8
2 
114.
08 119.94 
133.
85 
145.
72 163.24 
C12 Footwear 29.69 45.84 33.43 
30.3
6 
31.5
3 
35.8
4 40.16 
45.6
7 
51.3
4 54.99 
C13 
Non-metallic 
minerals 68.43 79.90 56.85 
48.0
0 
39.6
7 
51.5
4 52.70 
55.3
3 
68.1
8 64.36 
C14 
Precious stones and 
metals 6.09 6.50 7.26 
12.5
1 7.38 8.25 6.12 
11.7
7 4.26 18.97 
C15 Base metals 
230.3
0 
300.7
4 
251.2
1 
221.
14 
221.
54 
301.
08 363.87 
297.
08 
349.
54 392.41 
C16 Machinery 
449.3
8 
621.0
6 
437.9
7 
390.
06 
396.
46 
553.
66 647.86 
534.
61 
630.
08 794.94 
C17 
Transport 
equipment 
442.5
8 
453.0
4 
331.1
6 
346.
38 
239.
97 
376.
34 449.33 
407.
89 
419.
07 479.52 
C18 
Specialised 
equipment 36.12 52.45 34.13 
28.2
2 
30.4
6 
36.6
0 39.46 
45.5
7 
50.2
2 47.50 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0.87 1.09 0.89 0.64 0.69 0.78 1.82 1.13 0.71 0.97 
C20 
Misc manufactured 
articles 82.07 
110.9
2 72.51 
70.2
1 
66.9
3 
82.3
0 81.73 
93.6
5 
93.6
3 97.94 
C21 
Collectors' pieces & 
antiques 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.60 0.32 
C22 
Other unclassified 
goods 38.76 12.40 22.85 
15.2
5 
13.4
6 
13.8
1 15.67 
15.0
3 
19.9
5 15.73 
 
Lesotho imports from the rest of SACU 
Section Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
C01 Live animals, animal products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C02 Vegetable products 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.00 
C03 Animal or vegetable fats & oils 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C04 Food, beverages & tobacco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.75 
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C05 Mineral products 0.00 8.54 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 
C06 Chemical products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C07 Plastic products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 
C08 Raw hides 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C09 Wood products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 
C10 Paper products 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 
C11 Textiles & clothing 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.13 25.34 0.44 
C12 Footwear 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
C13 Non-metallic minerals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C14 Precious stones and metals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C15 Base metals 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 
C16 Machinery 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.00 
C17 Transport equipment 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 
C18 Specialised equipment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C20 Misc manufactured articles 0.00 0.00 0.01 7.65 0.07 0.05 
C21 Collectors' pieces & antiques 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C22 Other unclassified goods 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 
Namibia imports from the rest of SACU 
Sectio
n 
Description 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
C01 Live animals, animal products 26.492 31.232 63.221 62.112 67.682 85.202 
100.48
2 
C02 Vegetable products 33.359 38.413 77.882 72.139 73.293 97.236 104.6 
C03 Animal or vegetable fats & oils 6.268 8.01 20.783 17.544 19.15 23.892 34.178 
C04 Food, beverages & tobacco 71.638 
101.08
9 
232.84
7 
240.40
3 237.12 
333.11
6 
288.05
4 
C05 Mineral products 
171.19
2 
164.06
7 
101.42
2 69.763 92.483 
409.12
4 
287.17
3 
C06 Chemical products 80.823 91.397 
237.20
2 210.97 
233.81
5 
281.09
5 
308.76
3 
C07 Plastic products 40.325 48.05 91.304 97.833 
105.09
7 
126.96
9 
133.09
5 
C08 Raw hides 3.313 2.45 5.336 6.976 8.491 12.954 12.374 
C09 Wood products 10.272 13.581 25.967 31.12 33.322 39.656 40.794 
C10 Paper products 36.979 43.93 86.158 85.376 83.554 96.941 98.359 
C11 Textiles & clothing 48.264 46.739 
106.76
8 
115.56
1 
120.19
4 
164.01
3 
177.69
6 
C12 Footwear 13.862 13.137 28.12 32.432 34.803 48.182 44.723 
C13 Non-metallic minerals 20.137 26.219 41.685 48.094 51.854 72.823 75.569 
C14 Precious stones and metals 5.367 5.816 5.694 5.374 6.147 7.26 8.046 
C15 Base metals 91.622 93.966 
173.31
9 
171.60
2 
214.11
5 
251.16
5 
298.32
9 
C16 Machinery 
179.32
6 
210.53
1 
352.12
3 
369.30
5 
451.64
9 
550.53
4 
577.42
8 
C17 Transport equipment 
135.83
1 
153.87
8 
331.45
9 367.14 
382.42
1 
435.92
7 
492.33
5 
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C18 Specialised equipment 14.597 17.464 33.452 34.398 34.957 47.177 41 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0.583 10.406 0.946 1.199 1.539 1.529 1.153 
C20 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 22.888 28.708 52.539 57.784 63.831 72.561 76.002 
C21 Collectors' pieces & antiques 0.152 0.287 0.826 0.58 0.325 0.401 0.633 
C22 Other unclassified goods 1.989 1.681 3.611 3.538 2.758 3.53 5.009 
 
South Africa imports from the rest of SACU 
Sect
or Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
C01 
Live animals, animal 
products 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.56 0.29 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.00 
C02 Vegetable products 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C03 
Animal or vegetable 
fats & oils 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C04 
Food, beverages & 
tobacco 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 
C05 Mineral products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C06 Chemical products 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.62 0.10 0.00 0.52 0.09 0.21 
C07 Plastic products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C08 Raw hides 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C09 Wood products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C10 Paper products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C11 Textiles & clothing 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 
C12 Footwear 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C13 
Non-metallic 
minerals 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C14 
Precious stones and 
metals 0.00 3.71 0.38 
430.1
3 
398.3
9 
349.7
9 
263.3
5 
149.9
5 
216.6
7 
210.3
0 
C15 Base metals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 
C16 Machinery 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.44 0.55 0.02 0.03 0.07 
C17 
Transport 
equipment 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
C18 
Specialised 
equipment 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.04 
C19 Arms & ammunition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
C20 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
C21 
Collectors' pieces & 
antiques 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
C22 
Other unclassified 
goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Swaziland imports from the rest of SACU 
Section Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
C01 Live animals, animal products 35.93 42.17 64.18 58.69 33.67 33.97 
C02 Vegetable products 60.61 73.36 89.13 75.18 64.09 112.46 
C03 Animal or vegetable fats & oils 11.90 14.70 14.32 13.32 11.52 10.42 
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C04 Food, beverages & tobacco 59.88 87.06 112.49 103.69 66.55 84.42 
C05 Mineral products 112.83 119.95 162.84 204.83 201.71 184.11 
C06 Chemical products 158.97 221.99 442.90 283.05 112.74 124.87 
C07 Plastic products 38.76 45.19 65.03 54.15 43.76 54.01 
C08 Raw hides 1.13 1.80 2.45 1.91 1.22 2.78 
C09 Wood products 9.29 12.99 18.04 16.77 11.84 13.14 
C10 Paper products 34.33 45.31 53.02 42.91 37.45 37.55 
C11 Textiles & clothing 56.17 59.06 86.33 64.67 58.56 59.64 
C12 Footwear 7.56 13.31 18.82 13.82 9.80 10.94 
C13 Non-metallic minerals 9.63 14.21 17.19 17.32 12.07 14.49 
C14 Precious stones and metals 0.59 0.90 0.93 1.08 0.76 0.67 
C15 Base metals 56.19 71.13 98.31 107.17 76.92 77.37 
C16 Machinery 101.89 235.67 170.49 164.48 152.55 145.93 
C17 Transport equipment 70.82 114.25 122.81 82.39 62.69 52.44 
C18 Specialised equipment 6.30 8.96 8.94 12.07 8.97 11.51 
C19 Arms & ammunitions 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.35 0.19 0.32 
C20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 16.28 19.68 23.35 23.34 15.63 18.28 
C21 Collectors' pieces & antiques 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.12 
C22 Other unclassified goods 0.15 0.99 0.36 0.25 21.43 0.03 
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